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Reading, Writing, and Sexual Harassment:
Finding a Constitutional Remedy When Schools
Fail to Address Peer Abuse
KAREN MELLENCAMP DAVIS*
INTRODUCTION
In a Texas middle school, a thirteen-year-old girl allegedly was raped twice
in one day by schoolmates.' According to a suit filed in federal court, she
was first raped in a boys' restroom by four students while three others held
her down.2 School officials reportedly tried to cover up the incident after the
boys begged a coach not to notify his superiors "'They basically just told
her ... to go back to class and deal with the problem,"' the family's attorney
asserted. Later that day, two of the boys allegedly raped the special
education student again under a stairwell outside the school.' The complaint
alleged that the girl's mother "'had to demand"' that school officials report
the incident to authorities.
In Chicago, a fourteen-year-old boy allegedly raped a ten-year-old girl in
a secluded hallway after school officials allowed him to take the girl out of
her classroom.7 Her aunt voiced the devastating effects of the attack: "To
hear her say she doesn't even want to look in a mirror, at her own self,
because she's ashamed-to me that's not something a 10-year-old should have
to say to herself."8 After the attack, the girl's family kept her home while
they attempted to transfer her to another school. 9
In Pennsylvania, a hearing-impaired student charged in a federal lawsuit that
she was physically molested and verbally harassed during a graphic arts class
at her high school two to four times a week for several months. ' ° Another
* J.D. Candidate, 1994, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington; B.A., 1987, Indiana
University-Bloomington. I would like to thank Professor Patrick L. Baude, Associate Dean Lauren K.
Robel, and Notes Editor Daniel J. Mathis for their comments on earlier versions of this Note. My special
thanks go to my husband, Daniel L. Davis, for his constant support and encouragement.
1. Jerry Urban & Melanie Markley, Family of Girl Alleging Rapes Sues HISD, Hous. CHRON.,
Oct. 14, 1992, at A13.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. (quoting attorney L. Mickele Daniels).
5. Id.
6. Id. The lawsuit named the school district, school officials, the alleged attackers and their parents
as defendants. Id.
7. Matt Murray, Family Puts Rape Blame on School, CEH. TRm., Feb. 13, 1992, § 2, at 4.
8. Id.
9. Id. The girl's family was considering a lawsuit against the school at the time the news story was
written. Id.
10. D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Voc. Tech. Sch., 972 F.2d 1364, 1366 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 1045 (1993).
1123
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
girl said she was molested two to three times a week during the same class."
The girls alleged that several boys forced them into a unisex bathroom and a
darkroom, both of which were located in the classroom, where the boys
touched their breasts, sodomized them, and forced them to perform acts of
fellatio. 2 The female students also claimed they were forced to watch the
boys perform similar acts on their classmates.' 3 These events allegedly
occurred in a generally rowdy classroom under the supervision of a student
teacher who, according to the girls, "was or should have been in the
"114classroom during the time of the acts ....
Rape and molestation provide drastic examples of the types of sexual
harassment students inflict on their peers. Far more widespread, however, are
the more "innocent" forms of sexual harassment encountered by students in
classrooms, hallways, and playgrounds of schools in the 'United States. The
results of a study published in 1993 by the American Association of
University Women ("AAUW") reported that 81% of surveyed students said
they had experienced some form of sexual harassment, ranging from sexual
remarks to physical contact.' s A surprising 85% of girls and 76% of boys
reported experiencing "unwanted and unwelcome sexual behavior that
interferes with their lives."' 6 Though some adults have referred to the sexual
remarks and touching as harmless adolescent behavior, 7 such conduct can
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. THE AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY WOMEN EDUCATIONAL FOUNDATION, HOSTILE
HALLWAYS: THE AAUW SURVEY ON SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN AMERICA'S SCHOOLS 7 (June 1993)
[hereinafter HOSTILE HALLWAYS]. Students in the eighth through eleventh grades in 79 public schools
were asked:
During your whole school life, how often, if at all, has anyone (this includes students, teachers,
other school employees, or anyone else) done the following things to you when you did not
want them to?
* Made sexual comments, jokes, gestures, or looks.
* Showed, gave, or left you sexual pictures, photographs, illustrations, messages, or notes.
* Wrote sexual messages/graffiti about you on bathroom walls, in locker rooms, etc.
* Spread sexual rumors about you.
* Said you were gay or lesbian.
* Spied on you as you dressed or showered at school.
* Flashed or "mooned" you.
* Touched, grabbed, or pinched you in a sexual way.
* Pulled at your clothing in a sexual way.
* Intentionally brushed against you in a sexual way.
* Pulled your clothing off or down.
* Blocked your way or cornered you in a sexual way.
* Forced you to kiss him/her.
* Forced you to do something sexual, other than kissing.
Id. at 5 (emphasis in original). Students were given the following response choices: often, occasionally,
rarely, never, and not sure. Id. at 6.
16. Id. at 7.
17. See, e.g., Jane Gross, Schools Are Newest Arenas for Sex-Harassment Issues, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
11, 1992, at B8 (reporting that a California principal said that "what may look like harassment is often
just harmless adolescent exploration"); Peter Kendall, Sexual Harassment: Can It Happen in 3rd
Grade?, CHI. TRi., Nov. 3, 1992, § 1, at 1, 6 (quoting elementary school principal as saying "[c]hildren
are going to bother each other, tease each other and make each other feel bad .... But that is the story
1124 [Vol. 69:1123
PEER ABUSE
have a serious impact on students, causing some to drop out of a class 8 or
school19 and causing them to view themselves as second-class citizens.20
One mother believes that sexual harassment by classmates caused her daughter
to become distraught and fearful of school and to contemplate her own
death. 21 For one young woman who was molested by schoolmates while
attending a youth hockey tournament and then cruelly harassed at school for
bringing charges against her attackers, the results were far more tragic. On
returning to school, she faced students who called her "slut" and "whore" and
graffiti on her locker that read, "'Kill the bitch, she took our friends to
court."' 22 Reportedly, when the girl complained to a vice'principal, he told
her that he was too busy to deal with her problem and that she should clean
the locker herself.23 Distraught by the harassment, she ended her life at the
age of eighteen.24
Though the AAUW study found that both girls and boys experience sexual
harassment in school, more girls reported such harassment than did boys.
2s
In addition, girls report being harassed more often than boys; and girls,
especially African-American girls, report more severe problems associated
with the harassment.26 One educator and civil rights specialist has
of man. That's part of growing up. I really think that [calling it sexual harassment] is too far out"); see
also Richard Starr, Harassment Alarm Rings False, INSIGHT, June 28, 1993, at 40 (criticizing the
AAUW study for including in its definition of sexual harassment experiences other than being forced
to do something sexual besides kissing and being spied on while dressing or showering). Starr wrote:
"Much of what Hostile Hallways describes is boorish, brutal, uncivilized behavior. Doubtless it deserves
to be punished and suppressed. But in a strictly statistical sense, it's 'normal' behavior for children
going through what used to be called the 'awkward age."' Id.
18. See, e.g., Gross, supra note 17 (reporting that a high school girl transferred out of a computer
class after a group of boys continued to taunt her with suggestive remarks).
19. See, e.g., Sue Ellen Christian & Melita Marie Garza, For Teens, Child's Play Can Become
Sexual Harassment, CHI. TR., Oct. 29, 1991, at 1, 17 (reporting allegations by Chicago students that
abusive incidents caused their 16-year-old classmate to quit'school).
20. "'Girls are learning that they are second-class citizens, only valued for their physical attributes
.... This has a terribly detrimental effect on girls-and on boys. They will never learn equal
relationships unless they are told this is not appropriate."' Gross, supra note 17 (quoting the report of
Sharon Schuster, president of the AAUW).
21. John M. Leighty, When Teasing Goes over the Line, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 8, 1992, at 12
(discussing the effects of harassment on an eighth-grader who was taunted for several months about the
size of her breasts by a group of boys at school).
22. JoAnn Strauss, Note, Peer Sexual Harassment of High School Students: A Reasonable Student
Standard and an Affirmative Duty Imposed on Educational Institutions, 10 LAW & INEQ. J. 163, 164
(1992) (citing Doug Grow, Suicide Ended Kathi's 'Fight for Dignity,' MINN. STAR & TRIB., July 5,
1987, at IA).
23.Id. at 164.
24. Id.
25. Fifty-eight percent of all students surveyed said they had experienced at least one form of
harassment "often!' or "occasionally." HOSTILE HALLWAYS, supra note 15, at 7. When broken down by
gender, 66% of the girls and 49% of the boys answered this way. Thirty-one percent of the females,
contrasted with 18% of the males reported being harassed "often." Id.
26. Id. at 15. For example, 23% of students who reported harassment said they did not want to
attend school as a result; 33% of the girls surveyed said this (African American females: 39%; white
females: 33%; and hispanic females: 29%). Id. Twelve percent of boys also reported this. Id.
Twenty-three percent of the students reported not wanting to talk as much in class (girls: 32%; boys:
13%), Id. at 15, and 28% of girls and 13% of boys found it harder to pay attention in school. Id. at 16.
Furthermore, 20% of girls and 6% of boys reported making a lower grade in a class. Id.
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commented: "'Although young men can also be victims of sexual harassment,
it occurs less frequently, is usually less severe in form and seems to have less
impact on their self-esteem and life choices."' 27 Earlier studies showed a
greater disparity between the number of girls and the number of boys who had
been sexually harassed than the AAUW report showed. For example, one
study showed that 40% to 60% of girls and 10% of boys say they have been
sexually harassed.28 Whatever the exact numbers may be, the studies
demonstrate that peer sexual harassment in schools is a serious problem that
has a disproportionate effect on female students.
Courts have found sexual harassment of city and state government
employees by their fellow employees and supervisors to be a form of sex
discrimination and thus violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.29 Likewise, courts have held that students may sue
school districts for failing to act when teachers have sexually harassed
them.3" But when a private actor such as a fellow student inflicts the
harassment or abuse the issue becomes muddy. This Note argues that when
schools improperly or inadequately respond to sexual abuse or harassment
inflicted by students on students or where schools create situations in which
sexual abuse thrives, they have treated students differently on the basis of sex
and are subject to monetary liability under federal civil rights laws. Of course,
a school district or employee cannot be held liable for every sexual comment
or advance made by a student.3'
Nevertheless, a child should be able to recover damages if she is repeatedly
subjected to offensive remarks or advances or is the victim of a sufficiently
Sixty-four percent of girls and 36% of boys felt embarrassed because of the harassment. Id.
Forty-three percent of girls and 14% of boys felt less confident about themselves, while 16% of boys,
compared to 8% of girls, said the harassment caused them to feel more popular. Id. at 17. Thirty-nine
percent of girls and 8% of boys said sexual harassment made them feel scared, while 70% of girls,
compared with 24% of boys, said the harassment made them "very upset" or "somewhat upset." Id.
27. Leighty, supra note 21, at 12 (quoting the report of Nan D. Stein). Stein also notes that sexual
harassment is a common occurrence for female students who are enrolled in traditionally male courses
such as auto mechanics. Id. Surveys conducted in Minnesota and Massachusetts suggest that 50% of all
females have been victims of sexual harassment in elementary and secondary schools; 70% of the
harassment reportedly came from classmates and 30% from teachers. Id.
28. Christian & Garza, supra note 19, at 17 (quoting the statement of Eleanor Linn, Director of
programs for Educational Opportunity based at the University of Michigan).
29. See, e.g., Volk v. Coler, 845 F.2d 1422 (7th Cir. 1988); Bohen v. City of East Chicago, 799
F.2d 1180 (7th Cir. 1986).
30. See, e.g., Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d 720 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 1044 (1990); K.L. v. Southeast Delco Sch. Dist., 828 F. Supp. 1192 (E.D. Pa. 1993); C.M. v.
Southeast Delco Sch. Dist., 828 F. Supp. 1179 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
31. Courts might want to adopt standards similar to those used in employment situations. For
example, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission defines sexual harassment in employment
in this way: "Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical
conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment when.., such conduct has the purpose or effect
of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile,
or offensive working environment." 29 C.F.I. § 1604.1 1(a) (1993). For a discussion of using this hostile
environment standard to allow students to recover for sexual harassment, see Monica L. Sherer,
Comment, No Longer Just Child's Play: School Liability Under Title IXfor Peer Sexual Harassment,
141 U. PA. L. REv. 2119 (1993).
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harmful incident such as a rape or molestation that would have been avoided
had school authorities taken reasonable action.
Because many states clothe local government bodies with immunity under
state tort law, 32 children who have been injured at school have tried to
recover for their damages under the federal Constitution and § 1983 of the
Civil Rights Act of 1871." 3 To make out a prima facie case under § 1983
based on a constitutional violation, a plaintiff must show that government
conduct was a "cause in fact of plaintiffs constitutional deprivation."34 In
addition, the Supreme Court has held that the plaintiffs injury must not be
"too remote" a consequence of government action.35
In many cases of physical sexual abuse, plaintiffs have brought substantive
due process claims for the deprivation of their liberty interests3 6 in bodily
security under § 1983.3' These schoolchildren have received varying
responses from federal district and appellate courts, which are still struggling
with a 1989 Supreme Court decision that severely limited recovery from state
agencies for injuries inflicted by private parties.38 Part I of this Note
examines due process theories proposed on behalf of schoolchildren and
assesses their viability under recent case law. Part II discusses the advantages
an equal protection claim provides for plaintiffs and explores arguments under
§ 1983.
Though this Note focuses on constitutional remedies for peer sexual
harassment, recent developments under Title IX of the Education Amendments
of 1972 3 merit mention. Section 1983 might offer benefits for some
plaintiffs that Title IX does not. For example, Title IX only applies to
32. Note, however, that legislative and judicial actions have partially eroded the doctrine of
governmental immunity for negligent acts in about half of the states. MARTHA M. McCARTHY & NELDA
H. CAMBRON-MCCABE, PUBLIC SCHOOL LAW: TEACHERS' AND STUDENTS' RIGHTS 471 (2d ed. 1987).
For a more detailed look at state immunity laws which protect schools, see Allan E. Korpela,
Annotation, Modern Status of Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity as Applied to Public Schools and
Institutions of Higher Learning, 33 A.L.R.3d 703 (1970 & Supp. 1993). The federal remedy has the
added advantage of allowing attorney's fees for some plaintiffs who might otherwise be financially
unable to bring a claim. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988).
33. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). The statute provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable
to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress....
Id.
34. 1 SHELDON H. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION: THE LAW OF
SECTION 1983 § 2.01, at 52 (3d ed. 1991). For more on the mechanics of§ 1983, see id.
35. Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 285 (1980). For further discussion of proximate cause,
see NAHMOD, supra note 34, § 3.24.
36. The Supreme Court has recognized a liberty interest in being "free from ... unjustified
intrusions on personal security." Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673 (1977) (footnote omitted).
37. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiffs may also sue individual government employees to hold them
personally liable. MCCARTY & CAMBRON-MCCABE, supra note 32, at 305-06. This note, however, will
not discuss such claims.
38. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
39. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1988).
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schools that are receiving federal funds. If a school's funds have been cut off
because of a prior violation, plaintiff might have no recourse under Title IX.
In addition, § 1983 allows plaintiffs to sue individuals, while Title IX has
been held to allow plaintiffs to sue only institutions.4" At least one commen-
tator, however, has speculated that Title IX might now provide an easier way
to hold school districts liable than § 1983,'4 1 but the Supreme Court has left
this unclear.42 Under Title IX, public schools that receive federal funds are
required to offer equal services to boys and girls, with some exceptions.43
40. E.g., Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 901 (1st Cir. 1988); Doe v. Petaluma
City Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1560, 1576-77 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
41. William D. Valente, Liability for Teacher's Sexual Misconduct with Students-Closing and
Opening Vistas, 74 Educ. L. Rep. (West) 1021, 1030 (July 30, 1992).
42. See Ralph D. Mawdsley, Compensation for the Sexually Abused Student, 84 Educ. L. Rep.
(West) 13, 28 (Sept. 23, 1993). For a more detailed discussion of using Title IX to recover from school
districts for their failure to respond adequately to peer sexual harassment, see Sherer, supra note 3 1, and
Strauss, supra note 22.
43. Title IX provides: "No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from
participaton in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program
or activity receiving Federal financial assistance .... 20 U.S.C. § 168 1(a). The act then describes nine
exceptions. § 1681(a)(l)-(9).
In a few states, plaintiffs may want to turn to Title IX because § 1983 actions against school districts
are restricted or barred. In states which consider school districts arms of the state, plaintiffs have been
barred from bringing § 1983 actions in federal court because the Eleventh Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution prevents states and their agencies from being sued in federal court. E.g., Petaluma City,
830 F. Supp. at 1577. Eleventh Amendment immunity for violations of Title IX, however, has been
abrogated by 42 U.S.C. § 2000-7(a)(1) (1988). For a discussion of when a school district has been
considered an arm of the state for Eleventh Amendment purposes, see David L. Dagley & Lawrence L.
Oldaker, Are School Districts State Actors (Alter Egos)?, 79 Educ. L. Rep. (West) 367 (Feb. 25, 1993)
(stating that courts have held school districts in Utah, New Mexico, and California to be state agencies).
In addition, the Supreme Court has held that under § 1983, states are not suable persons, regardless of
where they are sued. Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Will might,
however, have no effect on local school districts. The Supreme Court in Monell v. Department of Soc.
Servs. of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 695-701 (1978), presumed that, for § 1983 purposes,
school boards were more closely related to municipalities than states. Dagley & Oldaker, supra at 377
n.68.
Another potential problem for plaintiffs suing under both Title IX and § 1983 is that the equal
protection claim might be "subsumed" by Title IX. Williams v. School Dist. of Bethlehem, 998 F.2d
168, 176 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 689 (1994). Pfeiffer v. Marion Center Area Sch. Dist.,
917 F.2d 779, 789 (3d Cir. 1990). InPfeiffer, the Third Circuit held that Title IX's enforcement scheme
was sufficiently comprehensive to indicate that Congress intended to foreclose § 1983 causes of action.
Id. at 789. The court relied on the doctrine set forth by the Supreme Court in Middlesex County
Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981), in which the Court held that
a plaintiff may not enlarge the remedies of a federal statute by basing a § 1983 claim on that statute
under the "and laws" provision of § 1983. See also Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1011-13 (1984)
(holding that the comprehensive enforcement scheme of the Education of the Handicapped Act
precluded plaintiff's equal protection claim); Mabry v. State Bd. for Community Colleges and
Occupational Educ., 597 F. Supp. 1235, 1239 (D. Colo. 1984) (holding that Title IX's enforcement
scheme is sufficiently comprehensive to preclude § 1983 claims), aff'd on other grounds, 813 F.2d 311
(10th Cir. 1987), and cert. denied, 484 U.S. 849 (1987). But see Leffel v. Wisconsin Interscholastic
Athletic Ass'n, 444 F. Supp. 1117, 1120 (E.D. Wis. 1978) (holding that Title IX cannot foreclose the
constitutional claim).
In Smith v. Robinson, the Court was concerned that plaintiffs would be able to receive a remedy that
Congress did not intend, and that they would be able to bypass important administrative procedures if
it allowed equal protection claims. 468 U.S. 992. The main issue was whether plaintiff could recover
attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 by bringing a § 1983 equal protection claim. The Education of
the Handicapped Act ("EHA"), 20 U.S.C. § 1400-1485 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992), did not provide for
attorney's fees. The Court felt this omission meant that Congress did not intend for plaintiffs' to collect
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In 1992, the Supreme Court held in Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public
Schools44 that a student who was sexually harassed by a teacher could
recover monetary damages from the school district under Title IX.
Recently, a federal district court held that a student could bring a hostile
environment claim45 against a school district if she alleges that the school
or its employees intended to discriminate against her by, for example, failing
to adequately address her complaints of peer sexual harassment.46 The most
interesting aspect of the court's opinion in Doe v. Petaluma City School
District was that it interpreted the Supreme Court's decision in Franklin v.
Gwinnett County Public Schools as allowing respondeat superior liability to
hold a school district liable under Title IX.47 Under this theory, if a teacher
intentionally discriminates by failing to act or attempting to cover up sexual
harassment, the school district could be liable under Title IX if the employee
was acting within the scope of her authority or if the employer knew or
should have known about the discrimination.48 Arguably, a teacher or
principal acts within her authority when she decides whether to discipline a
child, recommend discipline, refer a student to counseling, or report abuse to
attorney's fees. In addition, the Court was concerned that allowing a § 1983 action would let plaintiffs
go directly to court, bypassing the extensive procedural mechanisms of the EHA. The Court felt this
would "run counter to Congress' view that the needs of handicapped children are best accommodated
by having the parents and the local education agency work together to formulate an individualized plan
for each handicapped child's education." Id. 468 U.S. at 1012. The Smith decision, however, should not
be applied to Title IX because the EHA is much more detailed and comprehensive than Title IX. In
addition, attorney's fees are already available to Title IX plaintiffs. 42 U.S.C. § 1988; see supra note
32.
Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982), offers some evidence that the
Supreme Court would not find Title IX to be exclusive. In Hogan, the Court allowed a male plaintiff
to bring an equal protection claim against an all-female school, even though Title IX would have upheld
the denial of his admission. Whereas the Court in Smith appeared to base its decision on the idea that
Congress was enforcing the Equal Protection Clause when it enacted the EHA, stating that "[the EHA
is a comprehensive scheme set up by Congress to aid the states in complying with their constitutional
obligations ..... " Smith, 468 U.S. at 1009, the Court in Hogan was not convinced that Congress
enacted Title IX in furtherance of its power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. Hogan, 458 U.S. at
732.
Because Congress responded to Smith by amending the EHA to allow plaintiffs to bring equal
protection claims along with their EHA claims, Handicapped Children's Protection Act of 1986, Pub.
L. No. 99-372, § 3, 100 Stat. 796, 797 (1986) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f) (1988)), courts should
carefully consider whether the legislative history of a statute "unequivocally demonstrate[s]" that
Congress intended to foreclose constitutional claims. NAHMOD, supra note 34, § 2.12, at 117.
44. Franklin, 112 S. Ct. 1028 (1992).
45. Plaintiffs have brought hostile environment sexual harassment claims against employers when
they have been subjected to sexual harassment that was "sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter the
conditions of employment and create an abusive working environment."' Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson,
477 U.S. 57, 60 (1986) (citation omitted) (quoting Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir.
1982)); see also Patricia H. v. Berkeley Unified Sch. Dist., 836 F. Supp. 1288, 1293 (N.D. Cal. 1993)
(holding that hostile environment claims may also be brought under Title D).
46. Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1560, 1576 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
47. "Although not expressly stated in the opinion, the rule laid down by Franklin appears to be that,
under Title IX, damages are available only for intentional discrimination, but that respondeat superior
liability exists, so that an institution is deemed to have intentionally discriminated when one of its agents
has done so." Id. at 1575.
48. See Michael J. Phillips, Employer Sexual Harassment Liability Under Agency Principles: A
Second Look at Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 44 VAND. L. REv. 1229, 1244-46 (1991), and
sources cited therein for a discussion of the respondeat superior theory.
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parents or other administrators. If this is the case, Title IX might provide an
easier route to recovery than § 1983 under circumstances in which a plaintiff
must show that school employees had a widespread discriminatory custom or
practice that caused the violation. The Supreme Court, however, did not
explicitly state that it was applying respondeat superior liability to hold the
school district liable in Franklin. In addition to the teacher's sexual
harassment, the plaintiff also alleged that when she told school administrators
that the teacher was harassing her they did not act to stop him and they
discouraged her from bringing a claim against him.4 9 This has led at least
one court to believe that a school district can be liable for an employee's
disciminatory acts only if policy-makers were aware of the harassment and did
nothing to stop it.50 An answer to this controversy is beyond the scope of
this Note.
One point, however, seems clear: A plaintiff must show that some school
authority intended to discriminate against her on the basis of sex in order to
receive monetary damages under Title IX. Therefore, the theories for
proving an intent to discriminate posed in Part II are valuable in the context
of Title IX, as well as the Equal Protection Clause.
There are several types of activity or inactivity for which a school district
might be found to have violated the rights of a student. They include a single
decision of a policy-maker such as a school board or administrator; 52 an
official policy of the board or other policy-makers;53 a widespread custom
or practice that policy-makers knew or should have known about; 4 and a
failure to train employees to deal with students in a way that will not violate
49. Franklin v. Gwinett County Pub. Sch., 112 S. Ct. 1028, 1031 (1992).
50. Floyd v. Waiters, 831 F. Supp. 867, 876 (M.D. Ga. 1993) "In Title IX... Congress defined
'program or activity' to mean, among other things, 'operations of... a school system.' This definition
does not include the agents of such an entity. Thus, common-law agency principles do not apply to
claims under Title IX." Id.
51. Franklin, 112 S. Ct. at 1037; Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 648 F.2d 1104, 1110 (7th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1128 (1981); Petaluma City, 830 F. Supp. at 1575.
52. Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701 (1989). In most cases, governing bodies of
educational institutions are considered policy-makers; however, identification of policy-makers is a
matter of state law. Jeff Homer, Commentary, When Is a School District Liable Under 42 US.C. §
1983?-The Evolution of the "Policy or Custom" Requirement, 64 Educ. L. Rep. (West) 339, 347
(1991) (citing City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112 (1988)).
Most non-administrative employees such as teachers, drivers, and custodians probably would not be
policy-makers because their actions are not "final and unreviewable," but in some cases a superintendent
or other high-level administrator may be considered a policy-maker if she has final judgment. Homer,
supra at 348. This note will not attempt to identify a test for determining which school employees are
considered policy-makers.
53. Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
54. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112; Monell, 436 U.S. 658; Spell v. McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1380 (4th Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1027 (1988). One commentator has explained:
"Policy" involves statements, actions, regulations, bylaws or ordinances officially adopted by
a public entity's governing body or individuals who have been delegated policymaking
authority by that body. "Custom" relates to abusive practices so persistent that a municipal
policymaker has actual or constructive knowledge of the practices and accedes to their
continuation.
Homer, supra note 52, at 347.
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their constitutional rights." A school board is not likely to issue a rule that
students abuse each other or that teachers who view this abuse should ignore
the behavior. A board might, however, decide to run a school in such a way
as to create a more dangerous school environment by hiring inexperienced
teachers, or failing to employ or adhere to proper disciplinary and grievance
procedures.
In addition, a policy-maker could make a single decision to try to cover up
or ignore harassment or abuse.5 6 Because teachers, counselors, and principals
have the most direct contact with students, however, it seems more likely that
students will bring their cases under the theory that school employees have a
widespread custom or practice that caused or contributed to the constitutional
violation or on the theory that the school district has failed to train its
employees to deal with students in a manner-that will not violate their rights.
When a student brings a substantive due process claim against schools for
injuries inflicted by other students, the case generally ends when the court
finds that the school owes no affirmative duty to protect the child from third
parties because the child is not in school custody and the school has not
created the danger or put the student in a worse position. Therefore, the courts
do not have to determine whether the school is liable for a practice or custom
of its employees. Under the Equal Protection Clause, however, this becomes
a more critical issue. Therefore, Part II addresses the question of when a
school district should be liable for the acts of its employees who are not
considered policy-makers.
I. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
Finding a duty to protect students' liberty interests under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment" would allow victims of physical
abuse and injuries to recover, regardless of whether they were deemed victims
of sexual harassment or discrimination. The crucial problem under substantive
due process, however, is finding that schools have an affirmative duty to act
to prevent injury by private parties. 8 The United States Supreme Court
firmly planted this stumbling block in the paths of plaintiffs in DeShaney v.
Winnebago County Department of Social Services.59
55. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989).
56. E.g., Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d 720 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
1044 (1980).
57. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment reads in relevant part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
58. As will be discussed infra, an affirmative duty to act can more easily be found under the Equal
Protection Clause.
59. DeShaney, 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
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A. The Facts and Holding of DeShaney
When Joshua DeShaney was four, his father beat him so severely that he
entered a life-threatening coma. As a result, he is expected to be profoundly
retarded for the remainder of his life, which he likely will spend confined in
an institution.60 His mother brought a civil rights action under § 1983 against
Winnebago County, the Winnebago County Department of Social Services
("DSS"), and various employees of the DSS. The DeShaneys claimed that the
defendants deprived Joshua of his liberty interest without due process of law
in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment because they did not intervene to
protect him from his father, who the defendants knew or should have known
posed a threat to Joshua.6 The Court held that the defendants were not liable
because the purpose of the Due Process Clause "was to protect the people
from the State, not to ensure that the State protected them from each
other."62 The Court acknowledged, however, that in "limited circumstances
the Constitution imposes upon the State affirmative duties of care and
protection with respect to particular individuals."63 The Court cited cases in
which it had held that the State is required to provide incarcerated prisoners
with adequate medical care64 and involuntarily committed mental patients
with enough services to ensure their "reasonable safety" from themselves and
others. 65 The Court stated:
In the substantive due process analysis, it is the State's affirmative act of
restraining the individual's freedom to act on his own behalf-through
incarceration, institutionalization, or other similar restraint of personal
liberty-which is the "deprivation of liberty" triggering the protections of
the Due Process Clause, not its failure to act to protect his liberty interests
against harms inflicted by other means.66
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, said the Estelle-Young-
berg67 affirmative duty analysis was of no help to petitioners because
Joshua's injuries did not occur while he was in custody of the government. He
suggested, however, that if the local government had placed Joshua in a foster
home operated by its agents, it might have had an affirmative duty to protect
him.68 Chief Justice Rehnquist went on to note that the government played
no part in creating the dangers Joshua faced, nor did it render him more
60. Id. at 193.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 196.
63. Id. at 198.
64. Id. (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1976) (holding that the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, made applicable to the states through the Due Process
Clause, requires states to provide adequate medical care to inmates)).
65. Id. at 199 (citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 314-25 (1982) (extending the affirmative
duty analysis beyond the Eighth Amendment setting to hold that the Due Process Clause requires a state
to provide certain services to involuntarily committed mental patients)).
66. Id. at 200.
67. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
68. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201 n.9.
1132 [V/ol. 69:1123
PEER ABUSE
vulnerable to them.6 9 Courts have interpreted this statement as meaning that
creating a danger or putting a plaintiff in a more vulnerable position creates
a special relationship between the municipality and the child. From these
statements, attorneys for injured schoolchildren have found grounds to argue
that schools are responsible for protecting students despite the outcome in
DeShaney.
In DeShaney, the Supreme Court implied that to hold a governmental entity
liable for a due process violation when a private party causes the underlying
injury, the plaintiff must establish that the government entity had an
affirmative duty to protect her because of a special relationship and that a
direct causal link existed between the constitutional violation and the entity's
decision, policy, custom, or practice. ° The remainder of Part I looks at how
the lower federal courts have grappled with this requirement.
B. Imposing an Affirmative Duty Under Substantive Due Process
Students seeking to recover from school districts and officials have brought
three different arguments under § 1983 and the Due Process Clause: a
functional custody argument, a state-created danger argument, and a policy or
custom argument. The theory that students are in the functional custody of
schools for purposes of the Due Process Clause has received a negative
reception from several federal appellate courts, though several district courts
have accepted it.7 Though courts generally accept the argument that a state
has an affirmative duty to protect when it creates a danger or renders a person
more vulnerable, attorneys have had difficulty convincing courts that public
schools have created such a danger.72 Finally, courts have held that students
bringing claims against school districts and employees for injuries inflicted
by school personnel can have a cause of action based on the policy or custom
argument alone;73 but since DeShaney, lower courts have held that this
argument is insufficient in due process actions when a private actor committed
the underlying violative act.74
69. Id. But see the dissent written by Justice Brennan and joined by Justices Marshall and
Blackmun, focusing on the actions taken by the State to cut off sources of private aid. Id. at 205-07.
70. Gail Paulus Sorenson, School District Liability for Federal Civil Rights Violations Under
Section 1983, 76 Educ. L. Rep. (West) 313, 316 (Oct. 8, 1992). The DeShaney Court said that because
the Due Process Clause did not require the State to protect the boy from his father, it did not have to
address whether individual state actors had the requisite state of mind for a due process violation or
whether the allegations supported a § 1983 claim against the county and the local agency under Monell
and its "progeny." DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 202 n.10. Monell held that a government could not be liable
for its agents' actions on a respondeat superior theory, but that it could be held liable for its customs
or policies. Monell, 436 U.S. 658. Later cases sketched out how those customs and policies come into
existence.
71. See infra part I.B.1.
72. See infra part I.B.2.
73. E.g., Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d 720 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
1044 (1990).
74. D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Voc. Tech. Sch., 972 F.2d 1364 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113
S. Ct. 1045 (1993); Elliott v. New Miami Bd. of Educ., 799 F. Supp. 818 (S.D. Ohio 1992); Russell v.
Fannin County Sch. Dist., 784 F. Supp. 1576 (N.D. Ga. 1992), affid without opinion, 981 F.2d 1263
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1. Functional Custody Theory
Students arguing that they were in a school's custody when they were
injured have asserted that "compulsory attendance and the school defendants'
exercise of in loco parentis authority over their pupils so restrain school
children's liberty that plaintiffs can be considered to have been in state
'custody' during school hours for Fourteenth Amendment purposes."" The
Third, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits have explicitly rejected the functional
custody theory. Though the Fifth Circuit once supported the theory, it has
recently backed away from that position. 76
The Third Circuit took a stand against the theory in D.R. v. Middle Bucks
Area Vocational Technical School which involved a teenage girl who was
repeatedly molested by male students for several months." The Third
Circuit, sitting en banc, held that school defendants did not restrict the special
education student's freedom "to the extent that she was prevented from
meeting her basic needs. '78 The court rejected plaintiff's analogy between
a schoolchild and a prisoner or an involuntarily committed mental patient,
stating that "school thildren remain resident in their homes. Thus, they may
turn to persons unrelated to the state for help on a daily basis. '79 Addressing
the suggestion in DeShaney that a municipality might be liable if it had taken
Joshua out of his home and placed him in foster care, the court said students
are not sufficiently analogous to foster children because foster children
depend on the state, through their foster families, to meet their basic needs.8"
The Third Circuit followed in the footsteps of the Seventh Circuit, which
had held in J. 0. v. Alton Community Unit School District 11 that a girl abused
by a teacher did not have a cause of action under the functional custody
theory because the school had not rendered her unable to care for herself.8'
In Maldonado v. Josey,82 the Tenth Circuit followed the reasoning of Middle
Bucks and Alton Community and rejected the functional custody theory. Mark
Maldonado died of strangulation after his bandana became caught on a coat
rack in a cloakroom. The Tenth Circuit held that the boy's parent could not
recover from school defendants for their failure to supervise his son because
the state's "compulsory attendance laws in no way restrain a child's liberty
( lth Cir. 1992).
75. Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d at 1370.
76. The Eleventh Circuit appears to side with the Third, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits. It affirmed
Russell, but it wrote no opinion to explain its action. 981 F.2d 1263 (1 1th Cir. 1992).
77. Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d at 1366.
78. Id. at 1372.
79. Id.; see also J.O. v. Alton Community United Sch. Dist. 11, 909 F.2d 267, 272 (7th Cir. 1990).
80. Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d at 1372. The Supreme Court in DeShaney suggested that if Joshua had
been taken from his home and placed in a foster home, the agency might have had an affirmative duty
to protect him. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 201 n.9 (1989).
The Supreme Court, however, declined to express a definitive view on the foster care analogy. Id.
81. Alton Community, 909 F.2d 267 (stating, however, that plaintiff might have succeeded in stating
a cause of action if she had used the theory that school policies allowed sexual abuse to occur).
82. Maldonado, 975 F.2d 727 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1266 (1993).
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so as to render the child and his parents unable to care for the child's basic
needs."83
In Doe v. Taylor Independent School District, the Fifth Circuit supported
the functional custody approach, at least in cases where the abuser was a
school employee. The functional custody theory was one of two theories the
court used to impose liability on school officials who supervised an abusive
teacher.84 In 1992, the Fifth Circuit wrote that "by compelling a child to
attend public school, the state cultivates a special relationship with that child
and thus owes him an affirmative duty of protection.81 5 By separating the
child from her parent and natural protector, the state takes on a duty to protect
that child.86 Furthermore:
[I]f state agents responsible for the well-being of the child, know of an
asserted danger to such a child yet consciously fail to safeguard the child
from that danger, they will be liable for those injuries sustained by the
child provided that the injuries are affirmatively linked to the state agents'
nonfeasance.e
7
The Fifth Circuit noted that it was not deciding the question of a school
official's duty when injuries are inflicted by private parties. The court,
however, favorably cited pre-DeShaney cases in which it said that a public
school assumes a duty to protect schoolchildren from dangers posed by their
own anti-social activities and those of other students.8 8 In light of DeShaney
and cases in which the Supreme Court has held a municipality liable when the
plaintiff was injured by private parties while in its custody, 9 the natural
conclusion is that if a student is found to be in the custody of a school, the
school must take reasonable steps to protect that child from abuse by other
students. 90 On rehearing, however, the Fifth Circuit did not take the position
83. Id. at 73 1.
84. Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 975 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1066
(1993), and vacated, 987 F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1993), afJd inpart, rev'd inpart, No. 90-8431, 1994 WL
45241 (Mar. 3, 1994).
85. Id. at 147 (footnote omitted).
86. Id. at 146.
87. Id. (citing Yvonne L. v. New Mexico Dep't of Human Servs., 959 F.2d 883, 890 (10th Cir.
1992)).
88. Id. at 145 (citing Horton v. Goose Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 690 F.2d 470, 480 (5th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1207 (1983), and Lopez v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 817 F.2d 351, 356 (5th Cir.
1987)).
89. See, e.g., Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983) (holding prison liable for failure to protect inmate
from dangerous prisoner).
90. Cases in which federal district courts have approved of the finctional custody analysis include
D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Voc. Tech. Sch., No. Civ.A. 90-3018, No. Civ.A. 90-3060, 1991 WL 14082
(E.D. Pa. Feb. 1, 1991) (holding that students were in school's custody but that plaintiffs failed to prove
school district maintained a lax policy), rev'd, 972 F.2d 1364 (3d Cir. 1992); Waechter v. School Dist.
No. 14-030, 773 F. Supp. 1005 (W.D. Mich. 1991); Robert G. v. Newburgh City Sch. Dist., No. 89 Civ.
2978, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 1990); Pagano v. Massapequa Pub. Sch., 714 F.
Supp. 641 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (stating that school situation in which child was repeatedly harassed and
assaulted by fellow students was more like foster care than it was like DeShaney).
Cases in which federal district courts have disapproved of the custody theory include B.M.H. v.
School Bd. of Chesapeake, 883 F. Supp. 560 (E.D. Va. 1993); Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 830 F.
Supp. 1560 (N.D. Cal. 1993); Elliott v. New Miami Bd. of Educ., 799 F. Supp. 818 (S.D. Ohio 1992);
Russell v. Fannin County Sch. Dist., 784 F. Supp. 1576 (N.D. Ga. 1992), aft'd, 981 F.2d 1263 (11th
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that school officials had an affirmative duty to protect students because of a
custodial relationship. In fact, the majority did not discuss the theory.91 It
did not need to because a local government employee committed the
molestation.
Because of the extensive role schools play in the lives of their students,
because students often lack the maturity to seek help on their own, and
because mandatory attendance laws require that children be separated from
their natural protectors,92 courts should find that a custodial relationship
exists between a school district and its students such that it owes students
reasonable protection from acts of teachers and students that violate their
constitutional rights." If parents cannot be certain that their children will be
watched and cared for in school, how can they feel that they are fulfilling
their legal and moral obligation to provide supervision for their children when
they load them on the school bus five days a week? Parents who do not
provide adequate supervision of their children can be subject to state
intervention and criminal sanctions.94 When parents entrust their children to
the state's care for educational purposes, they expect schools to be held to a
similar standard. As the Fifth Circuit once stated:
Parents, guardians, and the children themselves have little choice but to
rely on the school officials for some measure of protection and security
while in school and can reasonably expect that the state will provide a safe
school environment. To hold otherwise would call into question the
constitutionality of compulsory attendance statutes, for we would be
permitting a state to compel parents to surrender their offspring to the
tender mercies of school officials without exacting some assurance from the
Cir. 1992); Stauffer v. Orangeville Sch. Dist., No. 89-C-20258, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19041 (N.D. Ill.
July 31, 1990).
91. Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 90-8431, 1994 WL 45241, at *44 n.3 (Mar. 3, 1994)
(stating that DeShaney "is possibly relevant to the constitutional duty imposed on [a school
superintendent and principal in their supervisory capacity], but only if an affirmative duty to protect
students from constitutional violations is placed on them, a duty which even Jane Doe disavows").
92. As the Third Circuit points out, parents can choose to teach their children in their own homes,
Black v. Indiana Area Sch. Dist., 985 F.2d 707, 713 (3d Cir. 1993); Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d at 1371,
but this alternative is not economically feasible for all parents. See id. at 1371; Adam M. Greenfield,
Annie Get Your Gun 'Cause Help Ain't Comin': The Need for Constitutional Protection from Peer
Abuse in Public Schools, 43 DUKE L.J. 588, 607 (1993).
93. For similar views and more commentary on the subject, see Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d at 1377-84
(Sloviter, C.J., dissenting); Greenfield, supra note 92 (arguing legal and functional custody can be found
in the school setting); Sorenson, supra note 70; Steven F. Huefner, Note, Affirmative Duties in the
Public Schools After DeShaney, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 1940 (1990).
94. For example, Indiana law allows the state to bring a Child in Need of Services Action when
parents do not provide adequate supervision. IND. CODE § 31-6-4-3(a) (1993). The state may also
terminate parental rights. IND. CODE § 31-6-5-4 (1993). In addition, the state can bring criminal neglect
charges against a parent for failure to supervise. IND. CODE § 35-46-1-4 (1993). Moreover, parents and
other private parties who voluntarily assume the care of children are sometimes held to rather high
standards. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 555 N.E.2d 1362, 1365 (Ind. App. 1990) (stating that leaving
children alone in tub while he got towels could be sufficient evidence to find caregiver guilty of criminal
neglect); Howard v. State, 481 N.E.2d 1315, 1317 (Ind. 1985) (holding that leaving children in bathtub
knowing that very hot water could be supplied to the tub and that children had played with water faucets
in the past is evidence of criminal neglect).
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state that school officials will undertake the role of guardian that parents
might not otherwise relinquish, even temporarily.s
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court may have already hinted that it would not
accept a functional custody theory in school cases. In Stoneking v. Bradford
Area School District ("Stoneking f'),96 the Third Circuit found that a
schoolchild who was sexually assaulted by a teacher was in the functional
custody of school authorities because she was commanded to attend school by
a compulsory education statute.97 On appeal, the Supreme Court remanded
the case for further consideration in light of DeShaney. It is not clear whether
the Court objected to the finding of custody, or if it was merely concerned
with the fact that the Third Circuit also grounded liability on state tort laws,
for in DeShaney, the Court stated that not every tort committed by a state
actor is transformed into a constitutional violation.98 The Court, however,
chose not to grant certiorari to resolve the question.
Though the Stoneking H court said that finding functional custody in a
school setting was arguably not out of line with DeShaney,99 the Third
Circuit thought it more expedient to find liability based on the theory that
school authorities caused plaintiffs injuries by establishing and maintaining
a policy, practice, or custom that directly caused her constitutional harm.
Later, in D.R. v. Middle Bucks, a majority of the Third Circuit sitting en banc
rejected the functional custody argument, stating that students are not
sufficiently restricted because they had the opportunity to seek help from
outside the school on a daily basis.'00 Even when young children are
passengers on a school bus, where they are unable to receive outside
assistance because of the "total custody the driver of a school bus exerts over
his passengers, '. °. the Third Circuit has held they cannot recover under a
functional custody theory. The court in Black v. Indiana Area School District
maintained:
We find this case indistinguishable from D.R. If anything, the
plaintiffs here were less affected by state restraints at the time of their
alleged injuries than was D.R. Neither the state compulsory attendance law
nor any other state rule required their presence on the Claypoole school
bus. Their parents, their primary caretakers, were free to arrange any other
form of alternate transportation or escort them to school personally....
Under our analysis in D.R., the relevant consideration is whether the
95. Doe v. Taylor Indep. Seh. Dist., 975 F.2d 137, 147 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
1066 (1993), and vacated, 987 F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1993), affd in part, rev'd inpart, No. 90-8431, 1994
WL 45241 (Mar. 3, 1994)..
96. Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 856 F.2d 594 (3d Cir. 1988), vacated sub nom., Smith
v. Stoneking, 489 U.S. 1062, affd on other grounds, 882 F.2d 720 (3d Cir. 1989), and cert. denied, 493
U.S. 1044 (1990).
97. Stoneking, 856 F.2d at 601.
98. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 202 (1989).
99. Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d 720,723 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
1044 (1990).
100. D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Voc. Tech. Sch., 972 F.2d 1364, 1372 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied,
493 U.S. 1045 (1993).
101. Black v. Indiana Area Sch. Dist., 985 F.2d 707, 715 (3d Cir. 1993) (Scirica, J., concurring).
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plaintiffs have been deprived of any avenue of assistance they would have
had absent any state involvement. °2
Though DeShaney left open the possibility that schoolchildren could recover
under substantive due process using the functional custody argument, three
appellate courts have explicitly rejected the theory in a school setting. Though
other circuits have yet to speak directly to the issue, the theory's usefulness
is in serious doubt.
2. State-Created Danger Theory
In DeShaney, the Supreme Court appeared to leave available the argument
that when a state creates a danger or makes someone more vulnerable to
danger, it has an affirmative duty to protect that individual.' 3 Several
federal appellate courts have recognized the state-created danger theory,
including the Eleventh, 0 4 Ninth,'0 5  Eighth, 10 6 and Seventh0 7  circuits.
In distinguishing D.R. v. Middle Bucks from cases in those circuits, the Third
Circuit pointed out that "[1]iability under the state-created danger theory is
predicated upon the states' affirmative acts which work to plaintiffs'
detriments in terms of exposure to danger."'0 8 The court agreed with the
Seventh Circuit that "the line between action and inaction, between inflicting
and failing to prevent the infliction of harm" is not a clearly drawn one.0 9
In fact, the Third Circuit quoted the Seventh Circuit stating, "If the state puts
a man in a position of danger from private persons and then fails to protect
him, it will not be heard to say that its role was merely passive; it is as much
an active tortfeasor as if it had thrown him into a snake pit.""0
102. Id. at 714. The court found that the school superintendent had no special relationship with the
students because the state had not affirmatively restricted their freedom. Id. In addition, the bus driver
was not liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because he was not considered a state actor-he worked for a
private company that contracted with the school district to provide transportation. Id.
103. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 201 (1989).
104. Cornelius v. Town of Highland Lake, 880 F.2d 348 (1 1th Cir. 1989) (denying summary
judgment to the government when inmate laborers abducted and held a town clerk hostage for three
days), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1066 (1990).
105. Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding state liable for injuries caused by
rape when a trooper impounded a woman's car and left her to find her way home on foot), cert. denied,
498 U.S. 938 (1990).
106. Freeman v. Ferguson, 911 F.2d 52 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that plaintiff could maintain a
constitutional claim if plaintiff alleged that the police chief, a close personal friend of a man who killed
his wife and her daughter, stopped the police officers from enforcing a restraining order issued in
response to the wife's complaints).
107. Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200 (7th Cir. 1983) (stating that if a public officer had
knowingly directed traffic away from a burning car because he did not want the occupants to be saved,
he would be liable under § 1983 for depriving plaintiffs of their lives without due process, but holding
that an allegation that officer negligently failed to rescue does not constitute a claim under the
Constitution), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1049 (1984).
108. D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Voc. Tech. Sch., 972 F.2d 1364, 1374 (3d Cir. 1992) (emphasis
added), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1045 (1993).
109. Id. (quoting Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982)).
110. Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d at 1374 (quoting Bowers, 686 F.2d at 618).
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Nevertheless, the courts' application of the theory after DeShaney
demonstrates great reluctance to find that a school or a school official has
placed a student in a position of danger. For example, in Dorothy J. v. Little
Rock School District,"' the district court held that no special relationship
arose between government entities and the plaintiffs mentally handicapped
son, who allegedly had been molested and raped twice by Louis C., a fellow
student. Knowing that Louis was disposed to violent and sexually assaultive
behavior, social service agencies placed him in a school program with
mentally handicapped students. The school defendants also knew about Louis'
behavioral problems but nonetheless left him alone with the plaintiffs son.
The district court admitted that "[p]utting Louis C. with these students without
adequate protective measures created a potentially dangerous situation and
may have rendered the students more vulnerable to a violent attack than they
otherwise would have been without the state's action."1 2 Nevertheless, the
court found that the government agencies' act of placing Louis in the program
two years before the assault was too remote to constitute a substantive due
process claim under § 1983.
If Louis C.'s attack had come a few weeks or even months after his
placement in the ... program, the plaintiff might have a stronger case for
the existence of a duty to protect .... The significant lapse of time
between the state's act in placing Louis C. in the program and the attack
on Brian B. suggests that the attack "was independently conceived and
executed, and the state neither condoned nor encouraged [such] behav-
ior."''1
3
As for the school defendants, who were not responsible for placing Louis
in the program, the court held that their act of leaving the two boys alone was
not enough to establish a special relationship between them and Brian B. The
court said:
One could argue that leaving Louis C. alone with Brian B. was itself an
affirmative act which rendered Brian B. more vulnerable to harm. But the
same could be said about the defendants in DeShaney .... [The school
defendants] did not place Brian B. in a position of danger; they simply
failed to protect Brian B. from a student they supposedly knew to be
dangerous.''4
The outcome was similar in Middle Bucks, where the court dismissed the
complaints of D.R. and L.H., two female students in a graphic arts class who
were "physically, verbally and sexually molested" by several male
111. Dorothy J. v. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 794 F. Supp. 1405 (E.D. Ark. 1992), aff'd, 7 F.3d 729 (8th
Cir. 1993). But see Stauffer v. Orangeville Sch. Dist., 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19041 *8 (N.D. I11. July
31, 1990) (stating that "allowing [a student]... to go ... unsupervised with another student who had
a prior history of sexually abusing others and who had threatened Plaintiff' might be enough to find that
the teacher took an affirmative act to place student in a dangerous position.) Id. at *8.
112. Dorothy J., 794 F. Supp. at 1421.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1422.
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students." 5 D.R. alleged that she was forced or carried into the unisex
bathroom or the darkroom, both located within the classroom, two to four
times per week for several months. The class was supervised by a student
teacher who could not control the class and who allegedly witnessed the
student defendants use obscene language, gestures, and physical, though not
sexual, offensive touching of females in the class, including herself. In fact,
D.R. and L.H. asserted that the teacher was in the classroom when the boys
dragged D.R. into the bathroom but did nothing about it. When unpleasant
activities were occurring, the teacher generally ignored them or walked away,
according to plaintiffs." 6 They also asserted that L.H. informed an assistant
director of the school that a boy tried to force her into the bathroom to engage
in sexual conduct, but the assistant director did not take any action."'
Plaintiffs claimed that school defendants endangered them or increased their
risks of harm, by:
(1) failing to report to the parents or other authorities the misconduct
resulting in abuse to plaintiffs; (2) placing the class under the control of an
inadequately trained and supervised student teacher; (3) failing to demand
proper conduct of the student defendants; and (4) failing to investigate and
put a stop to the physical and sexual misconduct."'
The students also claimed that the school's acts of setting up the classroom
to include a unisex bathroom with an inside lock and a darkroom created or
increased plaintiffs' risk of danger, but the court readily dismissed this
argument." 9 Though the court found Middle Bucks to be "an extremely
close case,"'"2 it held that the school defendants did not "create plaintiffs'
peril, increase their risks of harm, or act to render them more vulnerable to
the student defendants' assaults."' 12' The court went on to say that the school
defendants' acts of assigning the student teacher to the graphic arts class and
failing to supervise her adequately might have created the recognizable risk
that students would not receive much education or that they might be injured
by non-sexual physical roughhousing. But, it said, plaintiffs' injuries from
sexual abuse did not result "from that kind of a foreseeable risk."'
' 2
115. D.IL v. Middle Bucks Area Voc. Tech. Sch., 972 F.2d 1364, 1366 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 1045 (1993).
116. Id. at 1378.
117. Id. at 1366.
118. Id. at 1373.
119. Id. at 1375 (noting the same conduct could have occurred had the school built separate
bathrooms; that the darkroom was a necessary part of the classroom; and that neither posed an
inherently dangerous environment).
120. Id.
121. Id. As one commentator has observed:
In cases of peer abuse, courts often limit their focus to the period in which the sexual abuse
took place, rather than examining the entire relationship between a school and its students. ...
This narrow inquiry, however, denies the reality that the school's actions prior to that time
contributed substantially to the resulting sexual molestation.
Greenfield, supra note 92, at 613.
122. Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d at 1374.
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One can certainly argue with the court's view that liability for one's acts or
omissions is limited to specific foreseeable consequences,' but that does
not seem necessary today. In 1989, when D.R. was abused, educators might
have been able to argue that molestation was not a foreseeable result of
leaving an inexperienced student teacher alone to supervise an unruly coed
classroom. If this case were to come before a court today, however, educators
would have little room to argue that sexual abuse was not a foreseeable result.
In light of the highly publicized AAUW study"z4 and the proliferation of
news stories regarding peer sexual harassment, sexual abuse should be
considered a foreseeable consequence of the school's conduct today.
As Middle Bucks demonstrates, courts are indeed drawing a thin line
between action and inaction, one that seems unjustified in light of the severity
of the harm and the egregious conduct of some school defendants. The Third
Circuit has dealt a harsh blow to schoolchildren who attempt to recover for
peer sexual assaults under a state-created danger theory. In order to recover
under Middle Bucks, students must show a more affirmative, direct, and
timely link between the schools' actions and their injuries than D.R.
could.'25
3. The Policy or Custom Argument
In Stoneking v. Bradford Area School District, a girl who was sexually
abused by a teacher argued that the school district was liable for causing her
constitutional harm. She claimed that by concealing and discouraging
students' claims of abuse, the school district created a climate which allowed
teachers to abuse students. She argued that a causal relationship existed
between this policy and the teacher's repeated sexual assaults. 26 The Third
Circuit explained that "[l]iability of municipal policymakers for policies or
customs chosen or recklessly maintained is not dependent upon the existence
of a 'special relationship' between the municipal officials and the individuals
harmed."'2 7 The Third Circuit held that plaintiff could maintain a § 1983
claim because defendant's policy, practice, or custom directly caused her
constitutional harm. 1
28
Three years later, in D.R. v. Middle Bucks, the Third Circuit said the custom
or policy argument does not apply when the case "lacks the linchpin of
Stoneking I1, namely, a violation by state actors."' 29 The court stated:
123. This is a hotly contested question in tort law. See W. PAGE KEETON Er AL., PROSSER AND
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 43, at 280 (5th ed. 1984).
124. HOSTILE HALLWAYS, supra note 15.
125. For a more thorough discussion of the state-created danger theory, see Huefher, supra note 93,
at 1958-65 and 1968-69.
126. Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d 720, 724-25 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 1044 (1990).
127. Id. at 725.
128. Id.
129. D.1L v. Middle Bucks Area Voc. Tech. Sc., 972 F.2d 1364, 1376 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 1045 (1993).
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"Sexual molestation committed by an agent of the state is readily distinguish-
able from the situation present here since the Due Process Clause itself
imposes limitations on the state's conduct." 3 The court seems to be saying
that if a teacher instead of students had molested D.R. she might have been
able to recover under Stoneking.131 Relying on the Supreme Court's decision
in City of Canton v. Harris, the Stoneking 11 court stated that a plaintiff can
bring a cause of action alleging that the school district "with deliberate
indifference to the consequences, established and maintained a policy, practice
or custom which directly caused her constitutional harm."'' 32 But Stoneking's
argument that the school district created an environment that allowed teachers
to abuse students is easily transferable to peer harassment cases such as
Middle Bucks.
A school district, which has the authority to control student behavior and
which places students and teachers in certain schools and classrooms, can also
be said to have created an atmosphere where students could be abused. The
fact that a student rather than a teacher commits the actual molestation does
not change the fact that the school may have committed certain acts that
helped cause the harm. 133 The court in Middle Bucks should have limited
itself to stating that the customs or policies of the school did not rise to the
level of placing a child in danger or worsening her position. Nevertheless,
Middle Bucks and subsequent cases 134 suggest that if a school district has
no affirmative duty based on a special relationship, it will not be liable under
§ 1983 for its customs or policies if a private actor inflicts the direct injury
and if the court is unwilling to find that a school district's custom or policy
created the danger or put the plaintiff in a worse postition. Indeed, this is
what the Supreme Court teaches in DeShaney.135
Courts' unwillingness to find that students are in the functional custody of
schools, or that schools have created or worsened the danger a student faces
leaves schoolchildren injured by fellow students to search for alternative
routes to recovery. Part II of this Note will discuss equal protection arguments
that might provide an answer for some plaintiffs.
130. Id.
131. Id.; see also City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989) (holding that a city can be liable
for failing to train police officers if its "failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights
of persons with whom police come into contact").
132. Stoneking, 882 F.2d at 725.
133. See Sorenson, supra note 70, at 325-27 (suggesting that the custom or policy theory could be
applied even though the molester was a student).
134. Elliott v. New Miami Bd. of Educ., 799 F. Supp. 818, 823-24 (S.D. Ohio 1992) ("In the matter
before this court, Faith Elliott's classmates committed the underlying violative acts. These students were
private actors, and thus were not in any way connected with the State of Ohio. Therefore, this Court
cannot impose liablility upon New Miami for its policies, customs, or practices."); see, Russell v. Fannin
County Sch. Dist., 784 F. Supp. 1576 (N.D. Ga. 1992) (holding that the school district was not liable
for custom or policy where injuries were inflicted by a private actor, but stating that its decision might
have been different if the student had notified teachers or administrators before he was injured that he
feared assault by another student), aff'd per curiam, 981 F.2d 1263 (11 th Cir. 1992).
135. See supra notes 59-70 and accompanying text.
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II. EQUAL PROTECTION
The Supreme Court in DeShaney said that, while a state has no general duty
to protect its citizens, it cannot "selectively deny its protective services to
certain disfavored minorities without violating the Equal Protection
Clause." 136 The Court has interpreted the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment'37 to prohibit gender discrimination unless the
government can show the discrimination has a "close and substantial
relationship to important governmental objectives. 1 31 Courts have held that
sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination prohibited by the Equal
Protection Clause.13 1 Plaintiffs seeking to hold school districts responsible
for their acts or omissions regarding peer sexual harassment have a greater
chance of recovery under the Equal Protection Clause than under the Due
Process Clause. Under substantive due process, the state must have the child
in its custody or must have created or worsened the danger she faces in order
to have an affirmative duty to act. But under equal protection, if a state offers
a service to one class of persons, it has an affirmative duty to offer equal
services to other classes unless it can justify the differential treatment by
meeting the heightened scrutiny test.
In addition, in certain circumstances, plaintiffs will find it easier to prove
that the school's actions caused the violation under equal protection than
under substantive due process. For example, when a plaintiff shows that the
school has a custom of treating complaints by girls differently from
complaints by boys, that in itself is the constitutional violation. "When a...
'policy or custom' is itself unconstitional, i.e., when it directly commands or
authorizes constitutional violations ... the causal connection between policy
and violation is manifest and does not require independent proof."' 40 Under
substantive due process, if a plaintiff argues that a government agency has
created a danger by placing a violent student in a classrom, for example, the
plaintiff might have trouble showing a direct causal relationship between the
136. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 197 n.3 (1989).
137. "No State shall.., deny to any person the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CoNST. amend.
XIV, § 1.
138. Personnel Adm'r of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979) (citing Craig v. Boren,
429 U.S. 190 (1976), a/td, 445 U.S. 901 (1980)). This test is referred to as heightened or intermediate
scrutiny, as opposed to the strict scrutiny that is imposed on racial classifications, and the rational basis
test which is used to judge laws that do not classify on the basis of race, national origin, gender, or
illegitimacy. Strict scrutiny requires that a classification based on race be necessary to a compelling state
purpose, while rational basis analysis requires that a classification be rationally related to a legitimate
government purpose.
139. E.g., Volk v. Coler, 845 F.2d 1422, 1431 (7th Cir. 1988) (citing as support Davis v. Passman,
442 U.S. 228, 234-35 (1979)); Bohen v. City of East Chicago, 799 F.2d 1180, 1185-86 (7th Cir. 1986);
Scott v. DeLeon, 603 F. Supp. 1328, 1332 (E.D. Mich. 1985). Cf. Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v.
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (holding that hostile environment sexual harassment is a form of sex
discrimination actionable under Title VII employment discrimination statute).
140. Spell v. McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1380, 1387 (1987) (citing Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808,
822 (1985)), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1027 (1988).
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government act and the deprivation of liberty inflicted by the violent
classmate. 141
The Equal Protection Clause poses a significant hurdle of its own, however.
The Supreme Court has held that plaintiffs bringing equal protection claims
must prove that the government actors intended to discriminate against
them.'42 Students bringing claims against school districts or personnel are
burdened with the task of showing that, by failing to respond to sexual
harassment problems or by creating an atmosphere where sexual harassment
can thrive, they are intentionally discriminating against them on the basis of
sex. It seems unlikely that students will be able to point to a specific school
policy that states sexual harassment claims should be ignored or treated less
seriously than other behavior problems. Rather, they will have to show that
the school district or school personnel discriminated by failing to address
complaints or by failing to train its employees to deal with complaints in a
nondiscriminatory manner, for example.
The question of intent is the "ultimate inquiry""'4 " in an equal protection
claim, and one that has generated much debate and confusion. The intent
analysis is easier to comprehend when an actual statute or written policy is
involved than when only governmental conduct is at issue. If a statute
distinguishes between men and women on its face, intent is clear and the law
will be struck down unless it meets the heightened scrutiny test.'" For
statutes that are facially gender-neutral, the Supreme Court set out the
following test in Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney: 45
The first question is whether the statutory classification is indeed neutral
in the sense that it is not gender based. If the classification itself, covert
or overt, is not based upon gender, the second question is whether the
adverse effect reflects invidious gender-based discrimination. In this second
inquiry, impact provides an "important starting point,".., but purposeful
discrimination is "the condition that offends the Constitution."' 46
The Court found that the statute in Feeney, which gave preference to
veterans applying for civil service jobs, was neutral on its face because it
defined veterans as including females. It also stated that the distinction
between veterans and nonveterans was not a pretext for gender discrimination
because many men who were not veterans were adversely affected as well as
women.'47 The Court then went on to ask the "dispositive question," which
was "whether the appellee has shown that a gender-based discriminatory
141. See Dorothy J. v. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 794 F. Supp. 1405 (E.D. Ark. 1992) (holding that a
student who is a ward'of the Department of Human Services is not a state actor, and thus school
officials had no constitutional duty to protect a mentally handicapped student raped by the ward), ajJ'd,
7 F.3d 729 (1993); see also supra notes 111-22 and accompanying text.
142. E.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
143. Bohen, 799 F.2d at 1187.
144. E.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
145. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979) (holding that a statute that gave preference to veterans, including
female veterans, did not violate equal protection), af'd, 445 U.S. 901 (1980).
146. Id. at 274 (citations omitted).
147. Id. at 274-75.
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purpose has, at least in some measure, shaped the Massachusetts veterans'
preference legislation."
1 48
Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, then suggested that if the
preference was originally created or subsequently reaffirmed because it would
"accomplish the collateral goal of keeping women in a stereotypic and
predefined place," it would violate the Equal Protection Clause.1 49 He
explained that the plaintiff must show the "decisionmaker ... selected or
reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part 'because of,' not
merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable group."' 5 It is
not clear, however, that the Feeney standard requires a malicious intent to
allow females to be harmed.' Rather, one can argue that "[a]cting upon
* . . a stereotypic view of sex roles directly harms women[] ... and thus
should be interpreted to indicate discriminatory intent,"'' 52 and "[if a Court
, .. finds that prejudicial attitudes toward a group influenced the state's policy
choices, it should find an equal protection violation."'53 Indeed, Feeney's
two-part test for facially neutral statutes seems to have this kind of deep-seat-
ed prejudice or bias in mind. If not, the Feeney Court would have had no
reason to ask the second question-whether the adverse effect reflects
invidious gender-based discrimination-having already asked if the classifica-
tion was covertly based on gender.
Courts have long held that discriminatory treatment, as well as enacted law,
is subject to the Equal Protection Clause. 54 Conceptually, however, the
intent analysis is somewhat more difficult to grasp. Circuit Judge Goldberg,
in a partial concurrence and partial dissent in McKee v. City of Rockwall,
Texas, 55 sets out a useful framework based on Feeney:
Because the exact words of a statute cannot be examined in a
discriminatory treatment case, one must analyze the policies, customs,
attitudes, understandings and practices of the entity or persons making the
alleged distinctions. Is the treatment gender neutral from the viewpoint of
148. Id. at 276.
149. Id. at 279.
150. Id.; see also \Vashington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); Volk v. Coler, 845 F.2d 1422, 1430-31
(7th Cir. 1988); Bohen v. City of East Chicago, 799 F.2d 1180, 1186 (7th Cir. 1986).
151. Amy Eppler, Note, Battered Women and the Equal Protection Clause: Will the Constitution
Help Them When the Police Won't?, 95 YALE L.. 788, 798 (1986). "Discriminatory intent should also
be found if it can be shown that the police's seemingly benign support for the privacy of the family is
actually premised on the belief that men should be in charge of the home. Acting upon such a
stereotypic view of sex roles directly harms women, and thus should be interpreted to indicate
discriminatory intent." Id. Judge Richard Posner equated a city's failure to address women's claims of
sexual harassment with the hypothetical case of a city deciding to provide restrooms for men but not
for women, "and when pressed for a reason [the city saying] it simply didn't care whether its female
employees were comfortable or not." Bohen, 799 F.2d at 1191 (Posner, J., concurring). In Bohen, Posner
noted that "[h]ostility to women was not shown, but did not have to be; indifference to their welfare was
enough.' Id. at 1191.
152. Eppler, supra note 151, at 798.
153. Id. at 803 (citing Larry G. Simon, Racially Prejudiced Governmental Actions: A Motivation
Theory of the Constitutional Ban Against Racial Discrimination, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1041, 1109
(1978)).
154. See Yick WVo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
155. McKee, 877 F.2d 409 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 23 (1990).
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the persons or entity making the distinction? If so, an examining court must
engage in a secondary line of inquiry and examine any alleged discrimina-
tory impact to determine whether the "adverse effect reflects invidious
gender-based discrimination."'
'16
If the entity or persons making the alleged classification understand that
they are purposefully treating males and females differently, then the court
can conclude that the different treatment is gender-based."17 But this is not
the only kind of purposeful discrimination. "A person who consciously
believes in the truth of the stereotype acts purposefully when the person
implements the stereotype in a particular situation."'5 8 Judge Goldberg cited
Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan,'59 in which the Supreme Court
said that "[c]are must be taken in ascertaining whether the statutory objective
itself reflects archaic and stereotypic notions."O6 In Hogan, the Court struck
down a policy that prevented men from enrolling in a nursing school in part
because the Court felt that keeping men out perpetuated the notion that
nursing was a woman's profession, which the Court contended would actually
harm women by keeping wages low.' 6' Following the Hogan analysis, Judge
Goldberg commented in McKee v. City of Rockwall: "Continuity of a
stereotype through the generations combined with a person's action pursuant
to the alleged 'truth,, may be purposeful action on the person's part within the
meaning of the Equal Protection Clause."'162 Therefore, if plaintiffs can show
that their teachers or school administrators have an underlying prejudice in
favor of boys or they believe certain stereotypes-that it is fine for boys to
be sexually aggresive, that a girl who has been sexually harassed has asked
for that treatment, that boys are more honest than girls, or that the education
of boys is more important than the education of girls-and they act on these
prejudices or beliefs their actions should qualify as purposeful discrimination.
If defining intent is a tenuous business, proving it is equally taxing. It is
often difficult to know what constitutes a prima facie case for intent
63
because the Supreme Court has fashioned seemingly different tests for various
types of cases. As Professor Daniel Ortiz wrote, "The nature of the case
makes all the difference.' 164 For example, the intent test in a case in which
plaintiff claims a prosecutor has discriminated against prospective jurors on
the basis of race places a lighter burden on the individual and a greater
burden of rebuttal on the state than the intent tests in other types of cases.' 6'
156. Id. at 421 (Goldberg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Personnel Adm'r
v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 274 (1979), af'd, 445 U.S. 901 (1980)).
157. Id.
158. Id. at 422.
159. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (holding that a university policy which prevented men from
enrolling in nursing school violated equal protection).
160. Id. at 725.
161. Id. at 729-30 & n.15. Note, however, that the Court denounced the policy because of both
discrimination against men and subordination of women.
162. McKee, 877 F.2d at 422 (Goldberg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
163. NoRMAN ViElRA, CONSTITUrIONAL RIGHTS IN A NUTSHELL 66 (2d ed. 1990).
164. Daniel Ortiz, The Myth of Intent in Equal Protection, 41 STAN. L. REv. 1105, 1108 (1989).
165. Id. at 1122; see Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
1146 [Vol. 69:1123
PEER ABUSE
The individual challenging the selection procedure need only show that the
procedures have had a racially disparate impact on a minority group and that
the procedures were open to abuse to make out a prima facie case and force
the state to show "that 'permissible racially neutral selection criteria and
procedures' led to the underrepresentation."' A plurality in Davis v.
Bandemer,67 a gerrymandering case, also allowed plaintiff to make out a
prima facie case on weak evidence of intent. In voting cases, it has been
enough to show disparate impact and evidence that the jurisdiction engaged
in other kinds of discrimination in the past.
68
When considering racial discrimination in education, the Court has held that
purposeful intent to segregate one part of the school system is evidence of
intent to segregate the whole.'69 In contrast, Professor Ortiz argued, the
Court has required more substantial proof of intent---"evidence of actual
discriminatory motivation"-in employment and housing cases.'7
The Court does not vary review according to the size of the individual
penalties, but it does distinguish between various categories of interests. In
particular it appears to follow the familiar hierarchy the Court employs in
the fundamental rights strand of equal protection in deciding what level of
scrutiny to accord various kinds of interests. In that area, voting and certain
criminal process rights, along with the right to travel, receive heightened
scrutiny; education receives somewhat elevated scrutiny, in practice, if not
in theory; and traditional economic interests receive reduced scrutiny.'
Thus, Professor Ortiz concluded that "intent takes into account not only the
invidiousness of the government's classification but also the importance of the
individual interest at stake."'
172
When a plaintiff tries to hold a government entity liable for an unofficial
discriminatory practice of its employees, such as ignoring female students'
complaints of sexual harassment, the plot thickens.' 73 The Supreme Court
in City of Canton v. Harris stated, "[T]he proper standard for determining
when a municipality will be liable under § 1983 for constitutional wrongs
does not turn on any underlying culpability test that determines when such
wrongs have occurred."' 74
In City of Canton, the Court held that a goverment could be liable for
failing to train its employees to conduct their jobs in ways that did not violate
citizens' substantive due process rights if the government's failure amounted
166. Batson, 476 U.S. 79 (quoting Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 632 (1972)).
167. Davis, 478 U.S. 109, 128-29 (1986).
168. Ortiz, supra note 164, at 1122.
169. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
170. Ortiz, supra note 164, at 1122.
171. Id. at 1136-37 (footnotes omitted).
172. Id. at 1136.
173. Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978), held that although a
government could not be held liable under a respondeat superior theory, it could be liable for "practices
of state officials so permanent and well settled as to constitute a 'custom or usage' with the force of
law." Id.
174. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 n.8. (1989).
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to "deliberate indifference."' 75 If a reasonable person would know that some
activity required action to prevent violation of a constitutional right, yet the
defendant fails to take that action, then the defendant is deliberately
indifferent. 7 6 It remains unclear, however, whether the Court meant to
impose the deliberate indifference standard on all § 1983 causes of action,
including those under the Equal Protection Clause."7 Therefore, the question
arises whether the government must have purposefully discriminated against
students by failing to take action, or whether they must only be deliberately
indifferent to the purposeful discrimination of their employees. 7
Lower federal courts have held that where public employees have a history
of widespread intentional discrimination, their employer may be held liable
under § 1983 if it knew or had reason to know of the practice.'79
Actual knowledge may be evidenced by recorded reports to or discussions
by a municipal governing body. Constructive knowledge may be evidenced
by the fact that the practices have been so widespread or flagrant that in
the proper exercise of its official responsibilities the governing body should
have known about them. 80
Thus, a government entity can be liable if a discriminatory practice is so
"manifest as to imply the constructive acquiescence of senior policymaking
officials...'
Without explicitly discussing who the city policy-makers Were or what they
actually knew, the Seventh Circuit in 1986 held that a widespread practice of
sexual harassment by fire department employees was enough to find the city
liable. In Bohen v. City of East Chicago,'82 the Seventh Circuit examined
municipal liability and reversed a decision that sexual harassment inflicted by
plaintiff's supervisors and coworkers did not constitute sex discrimination
under the Equal Protection Clause. The court found the city liable under
§ 1983, stating:
175. Id. at 388.
176. 1 CIVIL AcTIONs AGAINST STATE AND LocAL GOVERNMENT ITS DIVISIONS, AGENCIES AND
OFFICERS § 7.68, at 613 (Jon L. Craig ed. 1992) (citing Howell v. Evans, 922 F.2d 712 (11th Cir. 1991),
vacated on other grounds, 931 F.2d 711 (11th Cir. 1991)); see Berry v. Muskogee, 900 F.2d 1489 (10th
Cir. 1990).
177. See NAHMOD, supra note 34, at 487.
178. Id.
179. E.g., Brown v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 923 F.2d 1474 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding that "a
longstanding and widespread practice is deemed authorized by the policymaking officials because they
must have known about it but failed to stop it"); Spell v. McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1380, 1387 (4th Cir.
1987) (holding custom or usage attributable to the govenment body when the "duration and frequency
of the practices warrants a finding of either actual or constructive knowledge by the... governing body
that the practices have become customary among its employees'), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1027 (1988).
180. Spell, 824 F.2d at 1386.
181. Sorlucco v. New York City Police Dep't, 971 F.2d 864 (2d Cir. 1992) (citing St. Louis v.
Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 130 (1988) (plurality opinion) (stating supervisor can be deemed to have
adopted policy if a "series of decisions by a subordinate official manifested a 'custom or usage' of
which the supervisor must have been aware') and Krulik v. Board of Educ. of the City of New York,
781 F.2d 15, 23 (2d Cir. 1986) ("[A]n individual official's acts can rise to the level of 'policy' when
'senior personnel' knowingly 'acquiesce' in their subordinates' behavior.') (citation omitted)).
182. Bohen, 799 F.2d 1180 (7th Cir. 1986).
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Under § 1983, actions of a state entity's employees are attributed to the
state entity itself if those actions are in furtherance of the entity's "policy
or custom." . . . A single act of a sufficiently high-ranking policymaker is
sufficient to establish an entity's policy or custom .... A policy or custom
may also be established by proving that the conduct complained of is a
"well-settled... practice ... even though such a custom has not received
formal approval through the body's decisionmaking channels .... An entity
may be liable even for "informal actions, if they reflect a general policy,
custom, or pattern of official conduct which even tacitly encourages
conduct depriving citizens of their constitutionally protected rights."' 83
The court went on to state that "management officials 184 responsible for
working conditions at the department 'knew the general picture if not the
details' of the pattern of sexual harassment.' ' 8 5 In addition, the department
addressed harassment complaints superficially and had no policy against
sexual harassment. "In sum, sexual harassment was the general on-going, and
accepted practice at the East Chicago Fire Department, and high-ranking,
supervisory, and management officials responsible for working conditions at
the department knew of, tolerated, and participated in the harassment. This
satisfies § 1983's requirement that the actions complained of be the policy or
custom of the state entity."'
86
In 1992, the Second Circuit rendered a decision in which it held that a
municipality's constructive acquiescence was enough to hold it liable. In
Sorlucco v. New York City Police Department,8 7 the court said, "[A] § 1983
plaintiff may establish a municipality's liability by demonstrating that the
actions of subordinate officers are sufficiently widespread to constitute the
constructive acquiescence of senior policymakers."' 8 The court stressed that
discrimination by the commissioner, the top policy maker in this case, was not
necessary. The Second Circuit reinstated a jury verdict for Sorlucco on her
equal protection claim against her employer, the police department. Sorlucco,
a new officer at the department, claimed that she was treated in a discrimina-
tory manner because of her gender after she reported being raped by a fellow
officer. Sorlucco was disciplined and eventually fired because she had been
183. Id. at 1188-89 (citations omitted).
184. The court did not discuss whether these management officials were policy-makers under a §
1983 analysis.
185. Bohen, 799 F.2d at 1189 (footnote omitted) (quoting Bohen v. City of East Chicago, 622 F.
Supp. 1234, 1240 (N.D. Ind. 1985)).
186. Id.
187. Sorlucco, 971 F.2d 864 (2d Cir. 1992).
188. Id. at 871 (citing St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112 (1988)). A custom will be attributed to
the government entity due to either actual or constructive knowledge when its agents have a
longstanding and frequent practice. See Bouman v. Block, 940 F.2d 1211 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 640 (1991); Gentile v. County of Suffolk, 926 F.2d 142, 152 & n.5, 153 (2d Cir. 1991);
Bordanaro v. McLeod, 871 F.2d 1151, 1155-58 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 820 (1989);
Watson v. Kansas City, 857 F.2d 690, 695-96 (10th Cir. 1988); Jones v. City of Chicago, 856 F.2d 985,
995-96 (7th Cir. 1988); Spell v. McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1380, 1387 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
1027 (1988); Karen M. Blum, Monell, DeShaney, and Zinermon Official Policy, Affirmative Duty,
Established State Procedure and Local Government Liability Under Section 1983, 24 CREIGHToN L.
REV. 1, 5-6 (1990).
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arrested for falsely reporting to county police officers that she did not know
her assailant. Her evidence of discriminatory behavior consisted of the facts
of her specific case and a five-year study that showed a greater percentage of
new female officers who were arrested during their probationary periods were
fired than were new male officers who were arrested.' 9
The statistics could be criticized because of the small numbers available for
comparison. But even though the appellate court said the statistics alone might
not have been enough to sufficiently prove gender discrimination, it found that
they had probative value, especially when combined with the specific facts of
the case. The plaintiff presented "ample facts concerning her treatment at the
hands of her supervisors from which the jury, in conjunction with the
statistical evidence, could have reasonably inferred that there was a custom
of sex bias operating within the NYPD and governing its disciplinary
decisions."190 That evidence included testimony from a former NYPD
lieutenant with Internal Affairs who described the department's investigation
of the officer who allegedly raped plaintiff as dilatory and negligent. The jury
also heard evidence that two internal offices of the department, working
independently, acted in a manner that could reasonably indicate that they
reflexively believed Ms. Sorlucco was lying and that her male attacker was
telling the truth. The court found this particularly egregious case, coupled
with statistical evidence of other discriminatory acts was enough to justify a
jury's finding of a department practice of gender discrimination. 9
The remainder of this Part will advance four equal protection theories under
which students who are sexually harassed or abused by their classmates might
be able to recover from school authorities. Because the case law says little
about students' equal protection claims under § 1983 against schools for
injuries inflicted by their classmates, 92 this Note relies on gender discrimi-
nation claims made against employers and police departments. These cases
seem particularly appropriate because of the similarities between the
teacher-student relationship and the employer-employee and police officer-citi-
zen relationships. Students are under the direction and authority of teachers
and other school personnel, similar to the way employees are under the
189. Sorlucco, 971 F.2d at 871. The study showed that 47 probationary officers were arrested from
1980-85. Twelve of them resigned. Thirty-one of the remaining officers were men of which nine were
reinstated and 22 were fired. All four of the remaining women who were arrested were fired. Id.
190. Id. at 871; see also, Watson, 857 F.2d 690 (holding that small statistical evidence combined
with other evidence showing bias was enough to support inference of discriminatory practice).
191. Sorlucco, 971 F.2d at 872-73.
192. At least one court has held that a girl who allegedly was sexually harassed by a high school
principal stated a claim under the Equal Protection Clause and § 1983. Brenner v. Sch. Dist. 47, No.
86-1343, 1987 WL 18819 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 12, 1987). In. addition, the plaintiffs in D.T. v. Indep. Sch.
Dist. No. 16 of Pawnee County, 894 F.2d 1176 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 879 (1990),
brought § 1983 claims charging violations of rights under the Due Process Clause, the Equal Protection
Clause, and the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments. Plaintiffs sought to recover from the school
district after a teacher/coach molested them. The court overturned a jury verdict for plaintiffs, finding
that the district's acts of hiring a teacher without investigating his criminal past were too remote from
the assaults, which occurred three years later. The court did not specifically discuss the equal protection
argument.
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control of their employers. While employers can affect employees' actions by
asserting economic control over them, public school officials can control
students through legally vested authority. For example, public schools
ordinarily have the authority to reasonably discipline students. 93 Public
schools also may restrict students' rights'94 to maintain an orderly environ-
ment conducive to education. In the microcosm of a school, employees also
take on roles similar to police officers in the adult world. School teachers and
administrators sometimes break up fights, investigate complaints, and
generally keep the peace.
The Equal Protection Clause requires public employers to treat male and
female employees equally unless they have a reason for discrimination that
bears a "close and substantial relationship to important governmental
objectives."'9 5 Likewise, police departments are required to carry out their
duties in a nondiscriminatory manner unless their actions meet the heightened
scrutiny test.196 Public schools should be held to the same standard.
Therefore, they should be required to respond to complaints made by girls and
boys in a nondiscriminatory manner, and they should be required to use their
authority to effect a just end: equal educational opportunities for girls and
boys.
Part II.A. presents the argument that if schools consistently give less
attention to complaints from girls than to complaints from boys, then they are
discriminating on the basis of gender in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause. Part II.B. analogizes schools' customs of ignoring sexual harassment
complaints with police departments' policies of not interfering in domestic
disputes and finds that such a custom, though it may be facially neutral,
violates the Equal Protection Clause. Part II.C. explores a failure-to-train
claim in a school setting. 197 Part II.D. argues that some school practices
pose more severe problems to girls than boys, and that when schools ignore
this difference, they do not provide an equal educational experience for
females because of their gender.
A. When Gender Discrimination Is the Only Explanation
If a female plaintiff can show that teachers or other school officials act on
boys' complaints of mistreatment by other classmates in a more satisfactory
193. MCCARTHY & CAmBRON-MCCABE, supra note 32, at 201-39.
194. E.g., Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986) (holding that school could restrict
student's speech in school).
195. Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256,273 (1979) (citing Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.
190, 197 (1976)), aff'd, 445 U.S. 901 (1980).
196. E.g., Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696 (9th Cir. 1990); see also Collins v. City
of Harker Heights, 112 S. Ct. 1061, 1065-66 (1992) ("[Ihe Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses
of the Fourteenth Amendment, and other provisions of the Federal Constitution afford protection to
employees who serve the government as well as to those who are served by them, and § 1983 provides
a cause of action for all citizens injured by an abridgement of those protections.").
197. In City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989), the Court held that a plaintiff can make a
claim under § 1983 that a city failed to train its employees, and that this deliberately indifferent failure
to train caused employees to violate a constitutional right.
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manner than they respond to girls' complaints, courts should consider that
those authorities have violated equal protection principles unless school
defendants can show that the reason for the different treatment was something
other than the victim's gender. If school officials consistently respond more
satisfactorily to boys' complaints than they do to girls' equally severe
complaints, gender must be the deciding factor."98 When no neutral, legiti-
mate explanation for disparate treatment of boys and girls exists, gender
discrimination is apparent.199
In Bohen v. City of East Chicago,0 0 for example, Judge Posner stated in
his concurrence that where the evidence showed that male employees could
get a response to any complaint of misconduct by coworkers, but females
could get no response, and where the city had put forth no other explanation
for such a difference, then Ms. Bohen had shown that the city allowed her to
be harassed "for no other reason than that she was a woman. '20 ' To hold the
school district liable for such behavior, a plaintiff must show that a policy-
maker with final authority in such matters made the decision to dispense the
disparate treatment with intent to discriminate or that a discriminatory policy,
custom, or practice can be attributed to the school district. 20 2 Section 1983
case law suggests that girls should have a viable claim against school districts
that allow their employees to consistently treat girls' complaints less
adequately than boys' complaints. A plaintiff could use statistical evidence to
show that girls' complaints are consistently treated differently. Unfortunately,
this could be harder to find in a school setting where such records probably
are not maintained on a daily basis. Testimony by other girls who experienced
the discrimatory treatment, however, could serve the same purpose. In
addition, Sorlucco shows that if a plaintiff's own case depicts sufficiently
egregious behavior on the part of school officials, her statistical evidence
might not need to be as compelling as otherwise. 2 3 Also under Sorlucco,
a court would find evidence of discrimination in other circumstances, such as
198. Another commentator has recently posed that such conduct should violate Title IX.
A school denies services to its female students, and provides services in a different manner if
it fails to investigate and punish peer sexual harassment as swiftly and thoroughly as it does
other misconduct such as fighting, swearing, and cheating. Not punishing student harassers, or
punishing them very lightly, indicates that a school treats these students with "different rules
of behavior [and] sanctions."
Sherer, supra note 31, at 2155 (quoting Department of Education regulations, 34 C.F.R. § 106.3 1(b)(4)
(1993)).
199. See Feeney, 442 U.S. at 275.
200. Bohen, 799 F.2d 1180, 1192 (1986) (Posner, J., concurring). In this case, plaintiff was a female
fire department dispatcher who claimed she was sexually harassed and assaulted by her superior, and
verbally harassed by other employees. Id.
201. Id.
202. Governing bodies of educational institutions are policy-makers in most cases. Homer, supra note
52, at 347. Most non-administrative employees such as teachers, drivers, and custodians are probably
not policy-makers because their actions are not final and unreviewable; in some cases, however, a
superintendent or other high-level administrator might be considered a policy-maker if he has final
judgment. Id. at 348. But identification of policy-makers is a matter of state law. City of St. Louis v.
Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112 (1988).
203. Sorlucco v. New York City Police Dep't, 971 F.2d 864, 872 (2d Cir. 1992).
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where school employees instinctively believe a male attacker was telling the
truth and that the girl was lying.
20 4
B. Analogy to Battered Spouses' Claims Against Police Department
If a school district argues that it has not discriminated against girls because
it does not act to prevent sexual harassment by students against girls or boys,
the plaintiff stands in a similar position as a woman who claims a police
policy of not interfering in domestic disputes is gender-based discrimination.
Plaintiff must show that school authorities are purposefully discriminating
against females by failing to address sexual harassment. Battered women who
bring equal protection claims against police departments argue that police
treat domestic violence cases differently, and thus classify and discriminate
against women, who ordinarily are the victims. 2°5 Girls might likewise argue
that schools pay less attention to sexual harassment and abuse than they do
to other disciplinary problems and that schools are thus classifying and
discriminating against girls, who are more often the victims of such behavior.
Police policies or customs of not arresting men for beating their wives or
girlfriends stem, in part, from societal attitudes about family life.206 At least
one commentator has suggested that these policies or customs are rooted in
the common law attitude that a man, as head of his household, had the right
to discipline his wife by beating her, within limits.0 7 Police departments
have also justified their policies on grounds that they should not invade the
family's privacy.2 8 In addition, police sometimes fail to arrest alleged wife
beaters because they believe the wife will eventually drop the charges against
her husband,0 9 or because they do not consider violence by spouses to be
as dangerous or harmful as violence by strangers.2"0 Still others might
believe the woman deserves the abuse. 211 Though attitudes behind schools'
treatment of sexual harassment cases might not be identical to the attitudes
204. Id. at 872-73.
205. Eppler, supra note 151; Laura S. Harper, Note, Battered Women Suing Police for Failure to
Intervene: Viable Legal Avenues After DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services,
75 CORNELL L. REv. 1393 (1990) (suggesting that despite the burden of proving intent, battered women
who bring claims against police departments for failing to protect them may have more success under
the Equal Protection Clause than the Due Process Clause).
206. Eppler, supra note 151, at 792.
207. Id. at 792-93.
208. Id. at 792.
209. See, e.g., McKee v. City of Rockwall, 877 F.2d 409, 411 (5th Cir. 1989) (stating that a police
chief allegedly told the victim's mother that police officers "[do] not like to make arrests in domestic
assault cases since the women involved either wouldn't file charges or would drop them prior to trial"),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1023 (1990).
210. See, e.g., Dudosh v. City of Allentown, 665 F. Supp. 381, 393-94 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (testimony
of patrolman explaining that different procedures are used when an intruder is an unknown burglar and
when an intruder is someone the victim knows, implying that strangers are more dangerous), vacated,
853 F.2d 917 (3d Cir.), and cert. denied, 488 U.S. 942 (1988).
211. See, e.g., Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696,701 (9th Cir. 1990) (officer allegedly
told plaintiff he "'did not blame plaintiff's husband for hitting her, because of the way she was carrying
on").
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behind police treatment of domestic violence, similar stereotypical thinking
might be at work. For example, educators might believe that sexual harass-
ment is not a serious problem nor as harmful as other types of behavioral
problems. They might adhere to the belief that "boys will be boys" and need
not be punished for their adolescent conduct.212 Some might even think that
girls who are sexually harassed desire such attention.2 3 Evidence that boys
receive more favorable treatment from educators 21 4 supports the notion that
educators might feel boys are more important than girls and they should be
sheltered from accusations of sexual misconduct. This societal attitude was
certainly prevalent in Minnesota, where students and members of the
community harassed a girl because she brought charges against members of
a star hockey team.2"'
Courts have held that a police practice of failing to respond to domestic
violence may give rise to § 1983 liability if plaintiff shows that: (1) it is the
policy or custom of the police to give less protection to domestic violence
victims than to others; (2) discrimination against women is the motivating
factor; and (3) plaintiff was injured by the policy or custom. 2' 6 Likewise,
a student should be able to recover if she can show it is the policy or custom
of school personnel to pay less attention to sexual harassment complaints;
discrimination based on sex is the motivating factor; and plaintiff was injured
by the custom.
The distinction over whether an entity is classifying on the basis of gender
or on the nature of the incident amounts to a matter of what scrutiny a court
will apply to the government action. If the classification is based on gender,
the defendant must show the classification is substantially related to an
important government interest. But if the distinction is based on the nature of
the complaint, the classification need only be rationally related to a legitimate
government interest.2 7 Though the rational basis test is normally fatal to
plaintiffs case, it might not be here. Because sexual harassment can result in
great physical and emotional harm, schools might have a difficult time
212. See, e.g., Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1560, 1564-65 (N.D. Cal. 1993)
(statement of school counselor that "boys will be boys" and that he did not report verbal harassment to
Title IX representative because he did not feel it was important); supra note 17 (comments of school
officials).
213. See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 22, at 164 (reciting that a caller told molestation victim's mother
that girls like such treatment: "My sons bring girls to the house all the time and I know they do that
and I know the girls like it"); The Mud Slinger, N.Y. TIMES, § 4, at 22 (Apr. 26, 1981) (editorial
recounting that Phyllis Schlafly, leader of group which opposed the Equal Rights Amendment, told the
Senate Labor Committee, "[w]hen a woman walks across the room.., she speaks with a universal body
laguage that most men intuitively understand.... Virtuous women are seldom accosted by unwelcome
sexual propositions or familiarities, obscene talk or profane language").
214. AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY WOMEN, How SCHOOLS SHORTCHANGE GIRLS (1992)
[hereinafter How SCHOOLS SHORTCHANGE GIRLS]; see also infra notes 252-56 and accompanying text.
215. Strauss, supra note 22, at 163-64.
216. Hynson v. City of Chester, Legal Dep't, 864 F.2d 1026, 1031 (3d Cir. 1988) (remanding to
allow plaintiff to amend complaint to clarify equal protection claim); Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't,
901 F.2d 696 (9th Cir. 1990) (reversing dismissal of equal protection claim because evidence suggested
animus against abused women).
217. See, e.g., Heller v. Doe, 113 S. Ct. 2637, 2642 (1993) (discussing the rational basis standard).
1154 [Vol. 69:1123
PEER ABUSE
arguing they have a legitimate governmental interest in treating such behavior
as a lesser.offense than other punishable student behavior.
In any event, a plaintiff is much more likely to succeed if she can show the
classification was based on gender. Evidence that girls are generally the
victims of sexual harassment is an appropriate starting place. In the words of
Judge Posner: "[S]exual harassment of men by women is extremely rare....
A policy of never responding to complaints about sexual harassment can
therefore be analogized to a police department's policy of never responding
to complaints of rape."2 8 As Judge Posner points out, plaintiff must show
a policy or custom of nonresponse or an "authoritative decision not to
respond '21 to hold a government entity liable.220
Under Professor Ortiz's analysis of the Supreme Court's intent doctrine, a
less stringent intent test should be applied than is used in less critical settings
because education is so important to individuals. In addition, under Keyes, 22'
purposeful racial discrimination in a meaningful portion of the school district
can imply purposeful discrimination in another part. By analogy, purposeful
discrimination against girls in other areas of the education program might
imply purposeful discrimination as to sexual harassment cases. As discussed
earlier,222 courts should find purposeful discrimination not only when school
personnel maliciously treat girls unequally, but also when teachers and
educators act on ingrained biases that favor boys. If failing to respond to
sexual harassment reflects this kind of harmful gender-based discrimination,
one should consider it purposeful discrimination that violates the Equal
Protection Clause.
C. Failure to Train as Basis for Liability
In a substantive due process case, the Supreme Court held that government
bodies can be liable when their failure to train causes employees to violate
individuals' constitutional rights.223 In City of Canton, the Court unanimous-
ly held that municipal liability can be imposed even though the challenged
policy itself did not violate the Constitution. The Court held that "the
inadequacy of police training may serve as the basis for section 1983 liability
only where the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights
of persons with whom the police come into contact. '224 The Court explained
that the "deliberate indifference" standard has nothing to do with the level of
culpability that may be required to make out the underlying constitutional
218. Bohen v. City of East Chicago, 799 F.2d 1180, 1190 (7th Cir. 1986).
219. Id.
220. For further discussion of what a plaintiff must show to hold a government entity liable, see
supra notes 53-56 and 179-91 and accompanying text.
221. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 208 (1973) ("[We hold that a finding of
intentionally segregative school board actions in a meaningful portion of the school system... creates
a presumption that other segregated schooling within the system is not adventitious.").
222. See supra notes 151-62 and accompanying text.
223. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989).
224. Id. at 388.
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violation. 225 The crucial determination in finding municipal liability is
whether a policy or custom was the "moving force" behind the violation.226
The Court elaborated on when a failure to train can be deemed a policy:
[I]t may happen that in light of the duties assigned to specific officers or
employees the need for more or different training is so obvious, and the
inadequacy so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights, that
the policymakers of the city can reasonably be said to have been deliber-
ately indifferent to the need. In that event, the failure to provide proper
training may fairly be said to represent a policy for which the city is
responsible, and for which the city may be held liable if it actually causes
injury. 227
As an example, the Court said, "[T]he need to train [police] officers in the
constitutional limitations on the use of deadly force.., can be said to be 'so
obvious,' that failure to do so could properly be characterized as 'deliberate
indifference' to constitutional rights." '228 Also, when officers violate
constitutional rights so often that the need for more training is obvious, a city
can be held deliberately indifferent if it fails to answer the need.229 The
Court added that the plaintiff would have to identify a particular deficiency
in the training program and show that the deficiency was the actual cause of
her constitutional injury.
Although Ms. Sorlucco did not bring a failure-to-train claim, the Second
Circuit wrote in dicta that such a claim was feasible because the police
department "tragically failed to show any sensitivity to the physical trauma
and the resulting psychological manifestations commonly experienced by rape
victims. It is not too much to expect that public agents charged with the
investigation of devastating sexual crimes appreciate the nature of the
casualties inflicted." 230 An analogous claim could be made against school
districts that fail to train their employees to deal with students' complaints of
abuse. One could argue that it is obvious that schoolteachers and administra-
tors will have to deal with students' complaints of sexual abuse, and it is
likely that without training they will do so in a way that violates the Equal
Protection Clause. When school employees deal with such complaints in a
discriminatory manner and the school district does not offer corrective
training, the school district could be found to fail the deliberate indifference
standard of City of Canton.
225. Id. at 389 n.8.
226. Id. at 389 (citing Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 316 (1981)).
227. Id. at 390.
228. Id. at 390 n.10. Under the City of Canton decision, a plaintiff apparently would not have to
show that the government unit acted with purposeful discrimination. Rather, it could be liable under §
1983 for its deliberate indifference to the discriminatory acts of its employees. NAHMOD, supra note 34,
at 487.
229. City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 390.
230. Sorlucco v. New York City Police Dep't, 971 F.2d 864 (2d Cir. 1992).
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D. School Liability When Sexual Harassment
Denies Girls Equal Education
Students in public schools endure sexual harassment ranging from
humiliating comments to physical abuse,23' and studies show that girls are
more often and more severely affected by such behavior. 2 Experts have
noted that girls enrolled in traditionally male classes are especially likely to
be harassed, causing them to drop those courses or avoid them. 3 Sexual
harassment also prevents girls from participating in classroom discussions.
Equity researcher Carol Shakeshaft of Hofstra University School of Education
commented: "[P]eer sexual harassment makes girls less willing to stand in
front of the class. Girls don't want to speak up, because the boys are going
to say they have big breasts. Girls we have studied have said, 'I won't go to
the front of the class,' because boys say things like they can smell their
period. The result of this kind of verbal and physical harassment is that girls
contain themselves. 234 In some cases, girls have even changed schools235
or dropped out because of harassment.3 6 These cases show that sexual
harassment limits girls in their educational pursuits.237 This argument is
analogous to Judge Posner's statement in his Bohen concurrence that "by
taking no steps to prevent sexual harassment, the city created a worse working
environment for women than for men, and this lowered the women's wages
(net of all disamenities and other costs of work) relative to the men's.1 238
Therefore, a school district which does not make reasonable efforts to
prevent verbal and physical harassment is not providing equal education to
females and males. Although education is not a fundamental right, 239 girls
are deprived of equal protection of the laws that provide for public schooling
if they do not receive the same benefits that boys get.240 Thus, though a
school offers the same courses and activities to girls, it discriminates against
them if it ignores the fact that girls are being deprived the full benefit of them
because of physical and verbal harassment. Professor Tribe points out: "[T]he
characteristic injury of sex discrimination lies not in the failure to be treated
231. See supra notes 1-23 and accompanying text.
232. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
233. Leighty, supra note 21, at 12.
234. Liza N. Burby, Girls Should Be Treated Equally, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 1993 (Long Island
Weekly), § 13, at 2.
235. See Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1560 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
236. See supra note 19; see also Burby, supra note 234 (quoting equity researcher as saying girls
who are sexually abused by teachers often drop out of school and move away).
237. Sherer, supra note 31, at 2134, 2153.
238. Bohen v. City of East Chicago, 799 F.2d 1180, 1191 (7th Cir. 1986) (Posner, J., concurring).
239. Rodriguez v. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist, 411 U.S. 1, 37 (1973).
240. Brenden v. Independent Sch. Dist., 477 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1973) (holding that whether or not
there is an absolute right to engage in athletics, female students are denied equal protection if they do
not get the benefits of participation in sports that boys get).
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on a gender-blind basis, but rather in being deprived of liberty or opportunity
because one is a woman, or because one is a man."
241
Schools might respond that they do not discriminate against girls because
their employees have not themselves sexually harassed them or because they
do not respond differently to complaints made by girls and complaints by
boys. That is, their response is inadequate in both situations. In fact, they may
argue that they treat boys and girls exactly the same. But when schools fail
to provide adequate supervision of students, as in D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area
Vocational Technical School,24 or fail to address sexual harassment in other
ways, they ignore the real differences between boys and girls. Girls are more
prone to physical and verbal sexual attack, which arguably carries greater
emotional trauma and stigma for girls than for boys;2 43 such abuse limits
girls in their educational pursuits; and such abuse leads to subordination of
girls and may lead to their subordination as women.
According to one sociologist who has studied teasing and insulting in
children eleven through thirteen years of age, some girls have not developed
the kind of self-defense skills that their male peers have, making the sexist
messages sent to girls especially difficult to handle. "'Boys teach each other
how to deal with it,"' said Donna Eder, professor of sociology at Indiana
University. "'At first I thought it would be best if kids learned how to
respond, but then I saw that there is no easy way to challenge the implicit
sexist message in these insults .... At one point I would have said you
should teach your -daughter how to take it. Now I don't think that's
enough.' "244
This gives all the more reason to hold schools responsible when they fail
to deal with sexual harassment problems. According to Professor Tribe,
"[Elquality can be denied when government fails to classify, with the result
that its rules or programs do not distinguish between persons who, for equal
protection purposes, should be regarded as differently situated. '245 This Note
does not suggest, however, that a school necessarily must "classify" its
students to provide equal education. Rather, schools should consider a
custom's disparate consequences for a group and adjust it to put students on
equal grounds. Students would not necessarily have to be treated differently
in most cases. For example, providing inadequate supervision might have
worse consequences for girls, but correcting the situation would not treat girls
and boys differently and would not disadvantage boys.
Conceivably, some might suggest that recognizing and acting to compensate
for these differences will tend to continue the stereotype that girls are weak
241. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-29, at 1580 (2d ed. 1988)
(emphasis in original).
242. Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d 1364 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1045 (1993).
243. Supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
244. Dave Matheny, Girl's Sexual-Harassment Charge Has Experts Taking Closer Look at Kids'
Behavior, STAR TRIB., Nov. 12, 1992, at 1E.
245. TRiBE, supra note 241, § 16-1, at 1438.
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and need to be protected.2 46 They might analogize to Professor Tribe's
suggestion that keeping women out of the military to protect them from sexual
attacks by the enemy or their male comrades perpetuates "the image of
women less as hardy citizens willing and able to pull their own weight than
as vulnerable creatures who must be sequestered at home for their own
safety."24 7 This Note, however, does not suggest that girls should be
sequestered from males, only that schools should take reasonable efforts to
prevent sexual harassment and thus remove what has become an obstacle in
the paths of girls seeking equal education. Requiring schools to provide
adequate supervision of students, to implement and follow adequate investiga-
tory and disciplinary procedures, or to educate students about appropriate
behavior would not privilege girls to the detriment of boys. Rather, it would
put them on more equal footing and would help provide for more civil
relationships between the sexes.248 In fact, boys would benefit by the extra
measures taken to provide an environment more conducive to learning.
There are differences between boys and girls-how they are socialized, and
how they react to various situations.249 Physical, sociological, or psychologi-
cal differences might make boys less adversely affected by a condition than
a girl would be. It is unfair to expect a girl to react to physical abuse or
verbal harassment in the same way a boy might. "Insistence upon the
'sameness' of men and women in the face of undeniable differences between
them and the social subordination of women by men enshrines male attributes
as the 'norm' and denies the existence and value of female attributes, pursuits,
and ways of life. '250 As one commentator has suggested, "[R]ecognizing
that we are all different from one another is the only way to break the cycle
of discrimination. 2 5 ' School, in fact, can be seen as a place where that
cycle begins, for it is at school where boys and girls learn much about what
is appropriate behavior. Moreover, school is where children begin to see how
the sexes relate to one another and where children begin to define roles for
themselves. But at school, girls repeatedly receive messages that they are
inferior to boys. For example, studies show that teachers pay more attention
to boys252 and give boys more praise, criticism, and more detailed instruc-
tions. 25 3 Textbooks stereotype or ignore females,254 and most standardized
246. Sherer, supra note 31, at 2166 (stating that "[s]ome critics argue that permitting a cause of
action for peer sexual harassment sends a harmful message that females are victims and encourages them
to let the court fight their battles for them").
247. TRINE, supra note 241, § 16-28, at 1573.
248. See Sherer, supra note 31, at 2168.
249. Supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text. For example, girls are four to five times more likely
to commit suicide than boys, and girls are twice as likely to feel sad and hopeless. How SCHOOLS
SHORTCHANGE GiRLs, supra note 214, at 79.
250. Robin West, Equality Theory, Marital Rape, and the Promise of the Fourteenth Amendment,
42 FLA. L. REv. 45, 58 (1990).
251. Martha Minow, Making All the Difference: Three Lessons in Equality, Neutrality, and
Tolerance, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 12 (1989).
252. How SCHOOLS SHORTCHANGE GIRLs, supra note 214, at 68-69.
253. Glen Harvey, Finding Reality Among the Myths: Why What You Thought About Sex Equity in
Education Isn't So, 67 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 509, 510-11 (1986). "Studies also indicate that the classroom
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tests are biased against girls.255 In preschool, teachers give boys more
attention and more hugs than girls."' Finally, many girls must deal with the
sexually offensive behavior of some classmates.
By failing to provide a safe school environment and by failing to prohibit
sexual harassment and assault, schools allow subordination of and discrimina-
tion against females to begin anew with each generation. A boy who harasses
and molests girls in schools may grow into a man who does the same in the
office or on the street.257 He could be the man who causes a woman to take
a less prestigious job or who causes her to restrict her life in order to prevent
assault. As one commentator has aptly stated, "The perpetuation of sexual
assault is inseparable from traditional female oppression, and is both an
expression of male dominance, and a method of maintaining it. 258
In today's legal environment, courts might not easily accept this type of
equal protection argument because a plaintiff such as D.R.259 will have to
prove that the school district or school employees by their actions or inactions
intended to discriminate against her because of her sex. It might be true that
a school does not intend to discriminate when it puts an ill-trained student
teacher in charge of a generally rowdy classroom or when it designs a
classroom in such a way that students can escape supervision and assault their
classmates. But school officials may be allowing rampant sexual abuse and
harassment to occur, doing nothing to stop it, when they know or should know
that girls will be injured disparately. One could argue that lack of action is a
result of an ingrained bias, and that girls are valued less than boys. If school
authorities shrug off sexual harassment with comments such as "boys will be
boys," they are continuing the stereotypical notion that boys are not
environment experienced by female students discourages their classroom participation, lowers their
self-esteem, and has a negative influence on their course and career choices." Id. at 511 (footnote
omitted). See also Myra Sadker & David Sadker, Sexism in the Classroom: From Grade School to
Graduate School, 67 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 512, 513 (1986) ("When boys call out, teachers tend to accept
their answers. When girls call out, teachers remediate their behavior and advise them to raise their
hands. Boys are being trained to be assertive; girls are being trained to be passive-spectators relegated
to the sidelines of classroom discussion.").
254. How SCHOOLS SHORTCHANGE GIRLS, supra note 214, at 61-63.
255. Id. at 52-57.
256. 1d. at 68.
257. "Sexual harassment starts with little boys picking on little girls and adults saying, 'Boys will
be boys' . . . . If you allow that to occur, then you get at the water cooler at work the sexual innuendo
and all the things women have to tolerate." Peter Kendall, Sexual Harassment: Can It Happen in 3rd
Grade?, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 3, 1992, § 1, at 6 (quoting school Superintendent Griff Powell).
258. Wendy Rae Willis, The Gun Is Always Pointed: Sexual Violence and Title III of the Violence
Against Women Act, 80 GEo. L.J. 2197-99 (1992) (citing Senate reports which show that violence
against women continues to increase, with the number of assaults rising almost 50% in 15 years).
259. Although D.R. did not bring an equal protection claim under § 1983, she brought a claim under
42 U.S.C. § 1985 (1988), charging that school officials conspired to deprive her of equal protection. The
Third Circuit rejected the claim, finding that she had not proven a conspiracy and her pleadings did not
adequately "establish that the alleged discriminatory polices or practices were due to plaintiffs
membership in the class of female students." D.P. v. Middle Bucks Area Voc. Tech. Sch., 972 F.2d
1364, 1377 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1045 (1993). Although § 1985 is a useful tool for
bringing discrimination claims, discussion of this statute is beyond the scope of this Note.
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responsible for their sexual aggressiveness and that girls must learn to handle
such harassment on their own.
The Supreme Court stated in Jenness v. Fortson2 61 that "[s]ometimes the
grossest discrimination can lie in treating things that are different as though
they were exactly alike. 2 6' In Jenness, the Court upheld a positive law that
accounted for differences. The Court did not find a government entity liable
for a failure to account for real differences, something that courts are more
unlikely to do. 62 Liability for treating girls and boys alike through
inadequate policies, customs, or practices that allow sexual abuse to flourish
falls into the latter category. By ignoring the fact that such practices can lead
to adverse effects on girls, schools fail to account for real differences.
Unfortunately, the courts have not favored such arguments because of a
"reluctance .... to recognize and especially to enforce affirmative govern-
mental duties to redress disadvantages or injuries not thought to be actively
engineered by government itself. 263
If courts should adopt the antisubjugation approach to equal protection, as
Professor Tribe and other commentators have suggested, the "real differences"
argument would be more readily accepted. The antisubjugation theory "aims
to break down legally created or legally reenforced systems of subordination
that treat some people as second-class citizens."'264 Currently, the courts
most often apply the antidiscrimination principle,265 which requires "the
purposeful, affirmative adoption or use of rules that disadvantage the target
group. '266 The antisubjugation approach looks at the "victim's state of
existence," while the antidiscrimination principle looks at the actor's state of
mind.2 67 Requiring plaintiffs to show that government officials took an
action because of its adverse effects on a group "overlooks the fact that
minorities can also be injured when the government is 'only' indifferent to
their suffering or 'merely' blind to how prior official discrimination
contributed to it and how current official acts will perpetuate it. '265
The Court voices antisubjugation principles at times, as in Mississippi
University for Women v. Hogan.269 Since its 1976 decision in Washington
260. Jenness, 403 U.S. 431 (1971) (upholding state election laws that imposed different ballot access
requirements on minor parties than it imposed on more established parties).
261. Id. at 442.
262. TRIBE, supra note 241, § 16-1, at 1439.
263. Id. § 16-1, 1439 n.21.
264. Id. § 16-21, at 1515.
265. Id. § 16-21, at 1514.
266. Id. § 16-21, at 1518.
267. Id. § 16-21, at 1519. For more on antisubjugation principles, see Ruth Colker, Anti-
Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003 (1986).
268. TRiBE, supra note 241, § 16-21, at 1517.
269. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (striking down a single-sex policy in part because it furthered
archaic views of women and caused nursing wages to remain low). Tribe points out that in addition to
Hogan, the Court applied antisubjugation principles to some extent in several cases, including Brown
v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982), and Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). TRIBE, supra note 241, § 16-21, at 1516-18.
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v. Davis,270 however, it has been wedded to the idea that purposeful
discrimination by government officials is necessary to find a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause. As has been demonstrated above, however, the Court
has allowed plaintiffs some leeway in proving purposeful discrimination when
the rights involved have been deemed particularly important.27' Because
education is crucial to advancing the lives of women and helping them to
overcome the subordinated roles women have held in society, courts should
hold school districts liable when they are conscious of situations that deprive
females of an equal education and they fail to take reasonable steps to correct
the problems.
CONCLUSION
Students seeking to hold schools responsible for physical sexual abuse
inflicted by other students might be able to do so under the Due Process
Clause, providing they bring their cases in jurisdictions that can still adopt the
functional custody theory. Alternatively, plaintiffs may seek to establish that
a special relationship exists because school officials created a danger or
placed the student in a worse position. If a plaintiff is unable to satisfy these
requirements, she might have a better argument under the Equal Protection,
Clause because schools must offer equal educational opportunities to girls and
boys. Similarly, recent developments suggest that Title IX is a plausible route
to recover for injuries caused by student-inflicted physical and verbal sexual
harassment. In the latter two arguments, however, the likelihood of recovery
varies, depending on who must have the required intent to discriminate and
what is required to prove that intent.
While two states have required schools to establish sexual harassment
policies,272 it appears that many school systems are still not adequately
addressing the problem.273 It is unfortunate that legislation or litigation is
necessary to prompt schools to act. However, fears that recognizing peer
sexual harassment claims against school districts will cause excessive
litigation, unwarranted awards, and rising insurance premiums, might not be
270. Washington, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (holding that disproportionate impact without a discriminatory
purpose was not enough to invalidate a test a police department gave to applicants).
271. See supra notes 164-72 and accompanying text.
272. Minnesota and California have passed legislation requiring sexual harassment policies in
schools. The Minnesota statute required all schools to have sexual harassment policies in place for the
1991 school year. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 127.46 (West 1989). The Minnesota statute includes "physical
conduct or communication of a sexual nature" that creates "an intimidating, hostile, or offensive ...
environment" at work or school in its definition of discrimination. MINN. STAT. AN. § 363.01.A1 (West
1991). The California law requires schools to adopt and distribute a written sexual harassment policy.
CAL. EDUC. CODE § 212.6 (West Supp. 1993). The California code defines sexual harassment as
"unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal, visual, or physical conduct
of a sexual nature, made by someone from or in the work or educational setting." Id. § 215.5 (West
Supp. 1993). For further discussion of these provisions, see Sherer, supra note 31, at 2139-42.
273. The AAUW report stated that 57% of students surveyed did not know if their school had a
sexual harassment policy. HOSTiLE HALLWAYS, supra note 15, at 21. Even if these schools have such
policies, if the students are unaware of them, one can assume they are not being adequately enforced.
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well-founded.274 But even if such results are possible, are they more
distasteful to society than allowing girls to be subjected to rape, molestation,
or severe verbal harassment in school only to be told by a court that they
cannot hold schools responsible for their injuries? When courts so hold, they
echo the school administration's message that girls must learn to deal with
sexual harassment on their own.
The effects of sexual harassment can be devastating, as the AAUW study
and numerous newspaper reports demonstrate; 275 school authorities' failure
to deal with the problem compounds the emotional impact. This is evident
from one sixteen-year-old girl's statement: "I wasn't dressed very provocative
and I gave them no reason to harass me. I was upset the administration didn't
respond immediately after I complained. I was told to ignore the harass-
ers."276 This teenager deserved more from her school, as did D.R. and L.H.
They deserved an opportunity to learn, unmolested by their peers; they
deserved to have their concerns and fears addressed by teachers and
administrators. They did not deserve to bear the full physical, emotional, and
economic impact of unforgettable injuries that school authorities could have
prevented, or at least alleviated.
274. Huefher writes:
Courts also have resisted widening the scope of constitutional torts out of fear of overlitigation
and court crowding. But recent studies of constitutional tort litigation in the federal courts
suggest that, contrary to popular perception, the advantages of section 1983 suits have not led
to an unusual increase either in filings of such suits or in judgments costly to government
bodies. One possible interpretation is that section 1983 may be playing at least as important
a role in deterring government misconduct as in providing relief in those exceptional cases in
which extreme misconduct actually occurs.
Huefner, supra note 93, at 1961-62 (citing Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart Schwab, The Reality of
Constitutional Tort Litigation, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 641 (1987)); see also Sherer, supra note 31, at 2167
("Contrary to the contention of critics, the availability of a peer sexual harassment claim under Title IX
will not lead to a litigation explosion or frivolous awards" if a school's liability.is limited to "only those
claims where the student can prove both that a hostile enviroment exists and that the school has failed
to take prompt and appropriate corrective action.") (footnotes omitted).
275. HOSTILE HALLWAYS, supra note 15, at 15-18.
276. Id. at 14.
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